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Climate protection in Germany: Party cues in a multi-party system

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Abstract

This paper provides insight into the impact of party cues on the public's desire for climate protection during the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, the effects of cues from one or multiple parties as well as the mechanisms behind these effects are analyzed. Utilizing the case of Germany's multi-party system, two online survey experiments with a representative sample of the German voting population are conducted. Despite finding rather small effect sizes overall, results show that a party statement in favor of more climate protection is effective in changing participants' opinions towards the same direction. People appear to be even more impressionable when they receive unexpected cues or are lead to believe that all parties work together to fight climate change. Finally, respondents that do not care about or oppose climate protection are more easily persuaded. Thus, these results could be employed to shape the way politicians and parties in multi-party systems convey the need for more ambitious climate policies.

Keywords: climate change, party cues, multi-party system, experiment

JEL Codes: C91, D91, Q54

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1 Introduction

In 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published their First Assessment Report concluding that anthropogenic climate change exists. Since then thousands of contributors from all related scientific areas repeated this conclusion in the following five reports and provided concrete advice on how to counteract the consequences. Yet, until today the existence of human-made climate change and if and how it should be approached is still up for public and especially political debate all around the world (Tschötschel, Schuck and Wonneberger, 2020).

Tackling this issue, this paper shows that a statement by a political party when it is in favor of more climate protection is effective in changing the public's opinion on this topic. This effect even increases once more than one party agrees on such a statement. Additionally, unexpected party cues and being uninterested in or denying climate change means being more impressionable and more easily persuaded.

One reason for the supposed contradiction between scientific evidence and human perception is that politically charged topics like climate change are not simply evaluated based on scientific results and factual information but based on one's own biased beliefs (Kahan et al., 2013; Meffert et al., 2006; Ditto et al., 2019). While especially outside the US and specifically in Europe the existence of climate change is largely accepted as fact, the discussion moved on to the best measures to be taken tackling climate change. Concerning such measures, the problem of biased information processing becomes even more persistent as a recent experiment by Douenne and Fabre (2022) reveals. According to them, pointing out factual information like the broad scientific consensus on the existence of anthropogenic climate change hardly improves respondents' support for a carbon tax. As a conclusion, they advocate for climate policies that are actually accepted by the public. But how can such policy support and behavior change be achieved?

One's own political stance is an important factor in the information evaluation process, as can be seen from countless examples from all around the world where public opinion on climate change is strongly polarized through party cues (Kousser and Tranter, 2018). The literature on party cues revolves around the conflict of interest between party stances and people's own political opinions, also known as the problem of party versus policy. In other words, this means whether a person rather follows the cue of a supported party or politician or their own beliefs if they do not align. Apparently, the answer to this question is not easily provided as studies on the topic come to rather opposing results (Nordø, 2021).

On the one hand, there is evidence that parties' and politicians' cues are more convincing than one's own convictions (Van Boven, Ehret and Sherman, 2018; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus, 2013; Cohen, 2003; Barber and Pope, 2019; Grewenig et al., 2020). One possible explanation for this is social identity theory which states that people view themselves as part of certain social groups. Once a person belongs to a specific group, they view said group as their in-group while other groups turn into out-groups. Humans tend to perceive their own in-group as positive and rather believe members of this group while out-groups are seen as negative and something that should be opposed (Russell, 2014). An individual's political orientation can be interpreted as a source of social identity, meaning that once a person relates to a specific political party, they will interpret this party's convictions as more positive and adopt them while opposing other party's stances (Iyengar et al., 2019).

On the other hand, some work provides evidence for the impact of policy over party (Lelkes, 2021; Bougher, 2017; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017; Nordø, 2021). This conclusion is based on the assumption that voters rather choose their party according to their own ideology instead of the other way round. Thus, due to the currently increasingly extreme points of view of parties and politicians, the rejection of opposing parties and therefore their ideologies increases (Lelkes, 2021).

Most of this debate is based on two-party systems such as the USA. According to Nordø (2021), the issue seems to become even more complicated when looking at multi-party systems, especially taking into account the lack of literature in this area (Stoeckel and Kuhn, 2018). Since many of the biggest industrial nations and at the same time biggest historical polluters are multi-party systems, it is crucial to gain more insight into the interrelation of policy and party in such systems which is why the studies presented in this paper are conducted in Germany. The German parliament has a long history of being a multi-party system. It currently consists of seven parties with vote shares between 5 and 26 percent according to the federal election of 2021.¹

This paper consists of two experimental vignette studies. The first one elicits the effect of a single party cue on respondents' desire for action to protect the environment and climate during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Results suggest that especially a party statement in favor of more climate protection is effective in changing participants'

¹More detailed information on the current composition and history of the German parliament can be found on its website: <https://www.bundestag.de/>.

opinions. Furthermore, unexpected party cues are more likely to lead to a change in opinion and cause respondents to rely on their knowledge and beliefs about politics and climate change. Being uninterested in or denying climate change also means being more impressionable and thus more easily persuaded of the opposing direction. The second study examines the effect of a pro or a con consensus on climate protection as well as a scenario in which all parliamentary parties disagree on the best policy. In this case again the pro consensus turns out to have the strongest significant effect while participants' knowledge and beliefs and environmental concern only play a tangential role. In both studies, respondents are additionally asked to decide on a donation in favor of or against more climate protection. However, in both cases hardly any or no significant effect of a change in this donation decision can be found. Yet, considering the persistent opinions people have on the topic of climate change finding even small significant effects is remarkable and a reason to reconsider the way this matter is conveyed by the majority of the German parliamentary parties that do believe that a change in climate policy is imperative.

Tschötschel et al. (2021) also noticed the impact of party cues and employed cues from German politicians into their experiments without finding significantly stronger effects than when only providing factual information on anthropogenic climate change. Yet, this work differs in several accounts. Firstly, the presented experiments include cues from parties instead of single politicians deeming personal sympathies or antipathies for certain politicians irrelevant. Secondly, for each party identical statements are used, making it possible to compare hypothetical scenarios, an approach that is generally novel for the case of multi-party systems such as Germany. Lastly, this paper includes two consensus treatments looking at the hypothetical scenario of all parliamentary parties agreeing on the best way to tackle climate change.

2 Study 1

2.1 Research questions

Some of the biggest economies worldwide constitute multi-party systems, such as Germany, France or Italy. This study investigates the effect party cues in such systems have on the public opinion as well as the mechanisms behind them employing the example of climate change.

How do party cues affect peoples' desire for action on environmental and cli-

mate protection?

Respondents that do not receive a cue from a party can be assumed to be less influenced by cues than those that are informed about a party stance. This hypothesis is consistent with the literature (Samuels and Zucco Jr, 2014; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014). It can be derived from various theories in the fields of political science, psychology as well as economics. The most prominent explanation is provided by the aforementioned social identity theory (Van Bavel and Pereira, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Russell, 2014; Shayo, 2009), suggesting that people react more severely to information from social groups, i.e. parties, they either belong to or oppose. In this study, I not only compare party with no-party cues but additionally the directions of the statement which is novel especially in the multi-party case.

Another explanation regarding this question stems from the behavioral economic literature on decision avoidance, suggesting that once the available alternatives are too similar or equally valuable, people tend to stick to the status quo (Goodman and Murray, 2007; Anderson, 2003; Dhar, 1997; Tversky and Shafir, 1992). In my experiment, this would translate to the hypothesis that people do not change their opinion if they neither care about climate change nor politics or care a lot about both but the alleged party stance and their own opinion do not align. Even though this explanation promises valuable insights into the mechanisms behind party cues (Wilson, 2011; Mullinix, 2016), it has hardly been recognized in the political science literature thus far.

How do people change their opinion if the party cue they get contradicts the typical stance they expect this party to have?

So far the sparse literature on party cues in multi-party systems only looked at the effect of factual party stances on the public opinion. However, parties can change their opinion especially on such important topics as climate change as the example of the Republican party in the US shows which only became skeptical of climate change once this topic started to be associated with the Democrats (Van Boven, Ehret and Sherman, 2018). Thus, in this study it should be examined what happens in the hypothetical scenario of a contradicting party cue. According to the belief based models from the literature on persuasion and marketing, surprising claims are more informative than typical ones and thus they exert more influence (Chiang and Knight, 2011; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). This leads to the supposition that unexpected cues have a larger effect in changing respondents' opinions than expected ones.

What are mechanisms through which party cues influence peoples' opinions on environmental and climate protection?

The first hypothesis regarding this question is again in line with the literature (Samuels and Zucco Jr, 2014; Carlson, 2016; Barber and Pope, 2019), namely that the more respondents prefer a party, the more effect party cues have on them. While this means that people follow a cue from a preferred party more, the opposite case does not necessarily have to be true. This supposition is best explained employing social identity theory once again. Albeit the difference between the own in-group, i.e. supported party, and out-group, i.e. opposed party, is easily figured out in a two-party context such as the US, in multi-party systems the out-group is more difficult to determine (Samuels and Zucco Jr, 2014). Thus, when confronted with a cue from another party, one's own or the position of the supported party comes into focus since this other party is not perceived as a clear out-group that can be distinctly opposed.

Finally, participant's opinions can be assumed to be influenced by their knowledge and beliefs in such a way that the more convinced they are to know the truth, the less effect political cues will have on them. More specifically, according to the literature this conviction expresses itself through being politically aware (Kam, 2005; Barber and Pope, 2019), highly educated (Barber and Pope, 2019; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017), well informed about climate change (Lelkes, 2021) or having strong opinions on the topic of climate change (Barber and Pope, 2019; Bougher, 2017; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017).

2.2 Method and data collection

The data was collected from the 8th to the 20th of April 2021 and is nationally representative regarding the 16 German federal states, as well as the German age and gender distribution. The 16 minute questionnaire was answered by 2,526 respondents who were recruited by respondi using the surveying platform Qualtrics. As it turned out that some participants filled out the survey twice, five responses had to be excluded from the analysis. An additional 18 respondents had to be dropped as they stated nonexistent postal codes². For the main results, another 499 people, or 19.9% of the remaining sample, are excluded from the analysis as they indicated that they did not understand the statements in the intended way, i.e. the pro statement was not understood as being pro environ-

²Postal codes are used to determine the respondent's district which in turn is employed to cluster standard errors.

mental and climate protection and vice versa. However, including these respondents does not change much about the results. Lastly, only one person in this final dataset stated to be of diverse gender, thus this person was also excluded as this would be too small of a subgroup for the gender variable. This results in a final sample of 2,003 respondents, the summary statistics for which can be seen in Table 1.³ It should be mentioned that the sample appears to have a generally high desire for action prior to the treatment (see Figure S1.1 in the Online Appendix).

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female (D)	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age	46.09	15.40	18	74
Monthly net income	2012.18	1324.30	150	8750
University degree (D)	0.28	0.45	0	1
Political interest	3.37	1.01	1	5
Own political orientation (left-right)	5.10	1.64	1	10
Political knowledge score	5.41	2.46	0	9
Sustainability score	3.14	0.71	1	5
NEP score	3.89	0.55	1.3	5
Climate change knowledge score	4.47	1.77	0	7

The survey is designed as an experimental vignette study where each respondent is shown one specific statement on the need for environmental and climate protection during the COVID-19 pandemic. The questionnaire is structured as follows. All respondents first have to answer a set of questions on their personal data, political orientation and knowledge, pro-environmental behavior, climate change knowledge, and environmental concern.

This is followed by a block of nine questions on respondents' opinions about taking action to protect the environment and climate which are all answered using 7-point Likert scales. More specifically, there are three different questions asked for three different types of agents. For the first question, participants should state how adequate they consider the actions currently taken by themselves, the German government or the world which they can answer on a scale from 1 (very exaggerated) to 7 (much too low).⁴ The second question asks how urgent respondents think it is that action is taken by themselves, the German government or the world which is answered on a scale from 1 (not at all urgent) to 7 (very urgent). Finally, for the third question participants should answer how im-

³Summary statistics by treatment group can be found in Table S1.1 in the Online Appendix.

⁴In the questionnaire itself, this scale was reversed, however for easier comparison it is referred to in the order presented here.

portant they think it is in the long term that action is taken by themselves, the German government or the world with the answer provided again via a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important). These nine questions are later on used to construct the main dependent variables for the analysis.

Furthermore, all respondents are asked to specify how they would like to split a donation of 200 Euro. The money is provided to them specifically for the purpose of donating it, they cannot keep it for themselves and cannot decide not to donate. They have the choice between two organizations that are in favor of more climate protection (Fridays for Future, BUND) and two organizations that are against more climate protection (EIKE, CFACT)⁵ or they can decide to donate to another cause that will be randomly chosen afterwards, thus respondents do not have an incentive to donate to a specific cause other than climate protection. They can choose to split the money freely, i.e. give all the money to one organization or to some or all of them.




Figure 1: Randomization for experimental vignettes

Next, the experimental vignette is introduced as can be seen in Figure 1. Each respondent is provided with a single statement. There are either two or three randomization steps that lead to the specific statement each respondent gets. First, it is determined whether the statement is to be labeled as being the prevailing opinion of one specific party or not labeled, i.e. the respondent gets the information that it is just an assessment of the urgency to take action protecting the environment and climate during the COVID-19 crisis. Next, if the statement is supposed to be labeled as a party statement, it is randomly determined which party out of the seven parties in the German parliament

⁵More information on these four organizations can be found in section A.1 of the Online Appendix.

should appear. Finally, in both cases, i.e. if there was a party label assigned or not, it is randomly specified what the statement is supposed to say. There are two possible statements, one that is in favor of more action to be taken protecting the environment and climate during the current pandemic, i.e. the pro statement, and one that is against this, i.e. the con statement⁶. Thus, there are in total 16 different possibilities for the statement and framing text the respondent can be provided with.⁷ In a last step, the respondent again has to answer the nine questions on taking action and the donation decision mentioned above.

2.3 Analysis

2.3.1 Dependent variables

The dependent variables for the main analysis are generated by taking the mean response to the nine aforementioned questions on taking action to protect the environment and climate separately for each type of question, each type of agent and all nine of them combined, i.e. the main dependent variable for the analysis hereafter called desire for action. This results in seven new variables with overall high scale reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha: adequacy $\alpha = 0.71$; urgency $\alpha = 0.86$; long term $\alpha = 0.89$; self $\alpha = 0.72$; government $\alpha = 0.88$; world $\alpha = 0.85$; all $\alpha = 0.92$). Additionally, the donation decision is turned into another new variable by subtracting the amount of money given to the two organizations that are against more climate protection from the amount given to the two organizations that are in favor of more climate protection. Thus this variable has a range from -100 (all of the money is given to one or both of the con climate protection organizations) to 100 (all of the money is given to one or both of the pro climate protection organizations).

2.3.2 Results

The first question focuses on how different party cues affect peoples' opinions on the need to take action to protect the environment and climate. Comparing the average change in desire for action in the labeled groups with the unlabeled ones, support in absolute terms is slightly higher in the former one. Figure 2 shows an average change of -0.033 vs. -0.026 for the con and 0.038 vs. 0.018 for the pro statements, respectively. This suggests that respondents generally follow the direction of the cue, i.e. decrease their support if they got a con cue and increase it in case of a pro cue. However, the difference between

⁶The English translation of the original German statements can be found in section A.2 of the Online Appendix.

⁷The credibility and intelligibility of the pro and con statements in connection with all seven parties was tested successfully in a prior online survey. More information on this survey can be found in section A.3 of the Online Appendix.

Figure 2: Average change in desire for action




Figure 3: The figure shows the change in the mean desire for action for the labeled and unlabeled con and pro statements, respectively. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Observations: con x no label = 113; con x party label = 848; pro x no label = 119; pro x party label = 923.

the labeled vs. unlabeled groups is not statistically significant ($p=0.705$ for con and $p=0.650$ for pro statements in a two-sided Mann–Whitney u-test). When comparing the average desire for action for the con and pro cues, the average for the con statement in absolute terms appears to be lower than for the pro statement i.e. 0.032 vs. 0.035 . Yet again, the difference in absolute value support is not statistically significant ($p=0.572$ in a two-sided Mann–Whitney u-test). Finally, in line with these results, when looking at the effect of each treatment on its own, only the labeled pro statements appear to be significant ($p=0.000$ in a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test) which is robust to including the respondents that did not understand the statements' intention correctly (see Table S1.2 in the Online Appendix).⁸

To further examine these effects for the different desire for action question types, OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at district level, i.e. the German "Kreis", and the delta for desire for action are run. The results can be found in Table S1.3 in the Online Appendix.⁹ The marginal effects (see Table S1.5 in the Online Appendix) for the different treatment groups show that the effect on the adequacy and long term score is highly significant for almost all treatments while for the urgency, self and world scores

⁸For the two-sided t-test both the labeled con and pro cues have a significant effect with $p=0.028$ and $p=0.001$ respectively, while the unlabeled cues are insignificant.

⁹For the results of the OLS regressions and Wilcoxon tests for the nine separate desire for action questions as described in the pre-analysis plan see section S1.3 in the Online Appendix.

only the labeled cues have significant effects. However, although for the later the cues are followed in the expected directions, i.e. negative for the con and positive for the pro cue, for adequacy the effect is always positive irrespective of the direction of the cue and for the long term score the opposite is the case. These results are robust when including all respondents and, except for the con labeled cues which become partly insignificant, also in Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (see Tables S1.6 and S1.7 in the Online Appendix). Interestingly, none of the seven parties in the German parliament seems to have a predominant overall effect as no clear pattern of significant results or bigger effect sizes emerges once the marginal effects are split up for every party separately (see Table S1.8 in the Online Appendix). In summary, this suggests that, while the differences are not huge, labeled cues seem to work better than unlabeled ones in changing respondents' desire for action especially if they are in favor of more environmental and climate protection rather than against it.


For the donation decision, only weakly significant effects for the labeled con cues in a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test ($p=0.082$) and the labeled pro cues for the marginal effects of the OLS regression ($p=0.054$) can be found. Other than that results are insignificant which is why the donation decision will not be examined further in the remainder of this analysis.

While according to these results some respondents indeed significantly change their desire for action after reading the statements, it has to be noted that about 70 to 80 percent of respondents for the nine questions on taking action and even 86 percent for the donation decision did not change their opinion. Also the correlation between the intensity of own environmental concern and political interest is higher in the group of respondents that stick to their initial answer (0.24) than the group that changes their opinion (0.07). These results suggest that participants generally maintain the status quo, even more so if they have strong opinions on climate change and politics alike.¹⁰

Next, I examine how people change their opinion if the party cue received contradicts the typical stance they expect from this party. In order to do so, the sample is split by

¹⁰As announced in the pre-analysis plan, it would have been interesting to compare the groups that are considered least likely to deviate in this situation, i.e. the respondents that are neither concerned with politics nor climate change and the respondents that are politically and environmentally interested while at the same time strongly supporting their treatment party that has a different stance on climate change than these respondents themselves have. However, only 50 people matched the criteria of the second group and thus, taking into account that there are seven different treatment parties, the results can not be considered reliable. Nevertheless, the results for the Wilcoxon tests can be found in Table S1.21 in the Online Appendix.

Figure 4: Effect of unexpected cue on absolute change in desire for action



Notes. The figure shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the OLS regressions of the absolute change in desire for action on an "unexpected cue" dummy and additional controls. Specifications include all control variables listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix as well as support for treatment party. The "unexpected cue" dummy is equal to 0 if the cue is anticipated and 1 otherwise. A cue is considered anticipated if it is in line with how important the respondent expected climate change to be for the treatment party, i.e. if the cue is pro and the party is expected to care about climate change or vice versa. Observations: all labeled: 1,771; supports treatment party: 667; opposes treatment party: 835.

support. Support is measured on a thermometer scale from -5 to +5 and a treatment party is considered supported when support is larger than zero and opposed when support is smaller than zero. I analyze the effect of an unexpected cue on the absolute value of change in desire for action employing an OLS regression. From the results depicted in Figure 4, it becomes apparent that an unexpected cue generally leads to a stronger change in opinion, even if the party is opposed by the respondent but especially so if the cue comes from a supported party.

Considering the actual direction of change in opinion, the results become more diverse. As depicted in column (1) of Table 2, receiving an unexpected con cue from a supported party leads to significant increase in desire for action meaning the respondent opposes the supported party's alleged stance. At the same time, as can be seen in column (4), an unexpected pro cue from an opposed party results in stronger support of the party's alleged opinion. The second result still holds when looking at the delta for desire for action as dependent variable (see Table S1.9 in the Online Appendix). Thus, provided that respondents generally support parties they expect to have a similar opinion as them-

Table 2: Effect of unexpected cue, OLS Regressions

Dependent variable:	Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	con x label	pro x label	con x label	pro x label
Unexpected cue (D)	0.167 (0.079)	-0.002 (0.047)	0.030 (0.044)	0.106 (0.040)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	314	353	410	425
R^2	0.827	0.869	0.912	0.912

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include all control variables listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix as well as support for treatment party and pre-treatment desire for action. The "unexpected cue" dummy is equal to 0 if the cue is anticipated and 1 otherwise. A cue is considered anticipated if it is in line with how important the respondent expected climate change to be for the treatment party, i.e. if the cue is pro and the party is expected to care about climate change or vice versa.

selves¹¹, one could say that an unexpected cue from an opposed party is more convincing when it is in line with one's own beliefs while an unexpected cue from a supported party might make respondents rather question the party's stance than their belief. Since the results are only significant for opposed parties that give an unexpected pro statement, i.e. are initially perceived as opposing climate protection, and supported parties that give an unexpected con statement, it can be concluded that these effects are only visible for respondents that generally support parties they consider pro climate protection which is in fact true for the majority of the sample.¹²

Finally, the mechanisms through which party cues influence peoples' opinions on environmental and climate protection are examined. For this purpose the OLS regressions with the split sample are repeated with post-treatment desire for action as dependent variable now focusing on respondents' knowledge and beliefs about the environment and politics. The detailed results can be found in Table S1.10 in the Online Appendix. From these regressions it becomes apparent that respondents hardly seem to take their knowledge and beliefs into account for unlabeled cues while relying on them for con cues from supported and pro cues from opposed parties. As established before, the majority of the sample would not anticipate such cues¹³, thus it can be concluded that participants rather rely on knowledge and beliefs once they face an unexpected party cue.

Looking at the results in more detail, it can be noted that respondents supporting their

¹¹Considering a maximum difference of one point on the 5-point Likert scale for the supported parties opinion on climate change and the respondent's 5-point NEP score, 89.82 percent of respondents support parties that they expect to have a similar opinion on climate change as themselves.

¹²Only 6.14 percent of respondents think that their favorite party considers climate change as not at all or not so important while 66.79 percent consider this topic to be important or very important for their preferred party.

¹³Two thirds of the sample consider climate change to be important or very important for their preferred party.

treatment party follow con cues more, the less they support their favorite party and the more they support the treatment party. Since the favorite party is generally perceived as in favor of climate protection, these results suggest that respondents either follow their favorite party or another supported party, i.e. the treatment party, depending on how big the difference in support for the two parties is. For a pro cue from an opposed party the effect seems to be more unambiguous namely that the more participants support their favorite party, the more they follow a pro cue even though it originates from an opposed party. Thus, party cues appear to have a stronger effect the more participants are in favor of some party.

Additionally, respondents that get a con cue from a supported party follow this cue more, the less politically interested, distrusting towards people and trusting towards parties they are. A pro cue from an opposed party however seems to be more convincing, the more they trust people in general, the less they know about politics and if they do not vote. All these results speak towards the fact that respondents appear to follow cues more the less they are convinced to know about the truth themselves. Overall, these results are robust to adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing, in regression models with the delta as dependent variable and when including all respondents (see Tables S1.11, S1.12 and S1.13 in the Online Appendix).

Table 3: Probit estimation marginal effects for NEP score

Dependent variable: Desire for action (change dummy)	No label		Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1) con x no label	(2) pro x no label	(3) con x label	(4) pro x label	(5) con x label	(6) pro x label
NEP score	-0.067 (0.044)	-0.151 (0.054)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.064 (0.026)	-0.090 (0.021)	-0.043 (0.026)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	115	314	353	410	425

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Except for the respondent's voting decision, all controls listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The "change dummy" is 1 if the respondent changed their answer to one of the desire for action questions from before to after the treatment and 0 otherwise. The NEP score is standardized.

The NEP scale, i.e. the measurement of how environmentally concerned a person is, however seems to be the most important factor for respondents when considering changing their desire for action. For all labeled statements a higher NEP score leads to a higher desire for action after treatments, suggesting that respondents' own concern for the environment has a considerable impact on their support for climate protection. Looking further into the effect of one's own pro-environmental beliefs reveals that respondents overall change their opinion significantly less often the more they are concerned about

climate change even when receiving unlabeled pro cues as can be seen in figure 3.¹⁴ Conversely, this means that the less participants care about climate change, the more impressionable they are. These results generally remain the same when including all respondents (see Table S1.15 in the Online Appendix).

3 Study 2

3.1 Research questions

The first study shows that while party cues do have a significant effect on respondents' opinions, especially so if they are in favor of more environmental and climate protection, in the case of unexpected cues participants rather rely on their own knowledge and beliefs. Since these unexpected cues only originate from one party at a time, it is easy to disregard them and fall back on own convictions. Furthermore, in reality parties try to set themselves apart from each other by adopting opposing stances on important topics and even though the existence of anthropogenic climate change itself is hardly denied in Germany and many other countries, the urgency and manner in which this crisis should be dealt with is largely discussed (Tschötschel, Schuck and Wonneberger, 2020). Thus, the following study should answer the questions of what effect a scenario would have in which all parties agree on the best policy regarding environmental and climate protection as well as what happens in terms of mechanisms once more than one party cue is not in line with respondents' expectations.

While a few works exist that include a scenario with multiple or all parties agreeing on a certain decision in party cue related experiments (Towfigh et al., 2016; Stoeckel and Kuhn, 2018), a consensus as it is presented within this study has never been examined before. For the supposition concerning the second question one can only assume similar impacts as in the first study, i.e. respondents that are confident in their own convictions are less likely to follow party cues. However, this effect should be less severe as multiple cues can be expected to have a stronger influence than a single cue. Regarding the impact of a consensus compared to a situation in which the parties disagree on the best policy, it can be assumed that the novel situation of a consensus is more effective in changing participants' opinions than a dissent as the former includes new and surprising information which according to the aforementioned literature on persuasion and marketing, exerts more influence (Chiang and Knight, 2011; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010).

¹⁴for the results of these probit regressions for all additional variables see Table S1.14 in the Online Appendix.

This hypothesis is in accordance with a related experiment by Stoeckel and Kuhn (2018) where they find that informing participants about a consensus of all German parties on international redistribution in economic crises is more convincing than telling them that a new party, the AfD, is against such a policy. Taking the results of the first survey into account, it can furthermore be assumed that respondents rather follow a consensus on more environmental and climate protection than an opposing one.

3.2 Method and data collection

The data was collected at the same time and in the same manner as for the first study, i.e. from the 8th to the 20th of April 2021 and nationally representative. From the initial 474 respondents for this study, three had to be dropped due to stating nonexistent postal codes. Another 81 people, or 17.2% of the remaining sample, are excluded from the main analysis as they indicated that they did not understand the statements in the intended way, i.e. the pro consensus was not understood as being pro environmental and climate protection and vice versa. However, similar to the first study including these respondents does not change much about the results. Finally, two people were dropped for indicating to be of diverse gender as this is again too small of a subgroup. The summary statistics for the final sample of 388 respondents, is depicted in Table 4.¹⁵ Same as in the first study, respondents seem to have a generally high desire for action prior to the treatment already (see Figure S2.1 in the Online Appendix).

Table 4: Summary statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female (D)	0.54	0.50	0	1
Age	45.37	15.59	19	73
University degree (D)	0.25	0.43	0	1
Political interest	3.31	1.00	1	5
Own political orientation (left-right)	5.19	1.76	1	10
Political knowledge score	5.30	2.46	0	9
Sustainability score	3.18	0.71	1	5
NEP score	3.92	0.51	2.5	5
Climate change knowledge score	4.41	1.81	0	7

This second study is supposed to answer the question of what effect a hypothetical consensus of all parties in the parliament would have. Thus, it is again designed as an experimental vignette study where each respondent gets to read seven different statements

¹⁵Summary statistics by treatment group can be found in Table S2.1 in the Online Appendix.

- one from each party - that are either in favor of or against more environmental and climate protection during the COVID-19 pandemic depending on the treatment group the respondent is assigned to. The structure of the questionnaire is identical to the one of the first study, hence the respondents first have to answer the same questions on personal data, political orientation and knowledge, pro-environmental behavior, climate change knowledge and environmental concern. After this, again the nine questions on respondents' opinion about taking action to protect the environment and climate as well as the donation decision follow.

Next, the respondent is provided with the experimental vignette, i.e. an overview of seven statements one from each of the seven parties in the German parliament, respectively. For each party two different statements could potentially be shown in the overview. Similar to the first study, the pro statement is in favor of more action to be taken protecting the environment and climate during the current pandemic and the con statement is against this.¹⁶ There is one single randomization step that determines for all parties whether their pro or con statement is shown to the respondent. In this randomization step one of three possible treatments is selected. The first one would be an all party consensus to take less action during the COVID-19 crisis meaning that for every party the con statement is shown to the respondent, i.e. the respondent gets to read seven different con statements. The second and opposite case would be the all party consensus to take more action, i.e. the pro statement is shown for all parties. Finally, in the party disagreement treatment, four parties are shown with the pro and three with the con statement. The state of the statements is predetermined taking into account the actual opinion each party would most likely have at the moment and always stays the same for this treatment. In a last step, the respondent again has to answer the nine questions on taking action and the donation decision mentioned before.

3.3 Analysis

3.3.1 Dependent variables

The dependent variables are constructed in the exact same way as for the first study which again results in seven new variables with almost the same scale reliabilities as before (Cronbach's alpha: adequacy $\alpha = 0.72$; urgency $\alpha = 0.83$; long term $\alpha = 0.85$; self $\alpha = 0.73$; government $\alpha = 0.87$; world $\alpha = 0.84$; all $\alpha = 0.91$) and the same new variable

¹⁶The English translation of the original German statements can be found in section section A.2 of the Online Appendix. Same as for the statements in the first study, the credibility and intelligibility of the pro and con statements for all seven parties was tested successfully in the aforementioned prior online survey. More information can be found in section section A.3 of the Online Appendix.

for the donation decision.

3.3.2 Results


In order to answer the question of what effect a scenario would have in which all parties agree on the best policy regarding environmental and climate protection, average desire for action in the consensus treatment groups and the disagreement group are compared. With mean deltas of -0.097 for the con and 0.141 for the pro consensus respondents seem to follow the direction of the cues again. The mean delta for the disagreement treatment amounts to 0.0349 and is thus slightly positive, however not statistically significant ($p=0.172$ in a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The pro consensus treatment unlike the con consensus treatment not only appears to have a significant effect in changing people's opinion ($p=0.000$ in a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test), but also seems to be significant compared to the disagreement treatment ($p=0.017$ in a two-sided Mann–Whitney u-test). Both of these results still hold when including all respondents (see Table S2.2 in the Online Appendix). Thus, it can be concluded that especially a pro consensus of all parties is effective in changing people's opinion on environmental and climate protection towards a more pro-environmental attitude. For the donation decision, none of the treatments has a significant effect which is why it is again not further discussed in the main analysis (results can be found in Tables S2.2 and S2.3 in the Online Appendix).

Focusing again on the six different sets of action question types, OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at district level and post-treatment desire for action as dependent variable are estimated (see Table S2.3 in the Online Appendix).¹⁷ The results of these regressions show that the change in desire for action seems to predominantly stem from the urgency type questions with significant effect sizes of 0.290 for the pro and -0.258 for the con consensus in comparison to the disagreement treatment ($p<0.01$ and $p<0.05$, respectively). These results are robust to adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing, in regression models with the deltas as dependent variables and two-sided Mann–Whitney u-tests and, at least for the pro consensus, when including all respondents (see Tables S2.5 to S2.8 in the Online Appendix). In line with the aforementioned Wilcoxon test results, especially the pro consensus treatment seems to be effective in changing respondents' opinion on almost all sets of questions, as can be seen in Figure 5 where the mean deltas for the different sets of question types and the significance stars for the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for each set of questions are depicted. It can be concluded

¹⁷For the results of the OLS regressions and Wilcoxon tests for the nine separate desire for action questions as described in the pre-analysis plan see section S2.3 in the Online Appendix.

that while both, the con and pro consensus, seem to influence people’s desire for action significantly more than all parties disagreeing on the issue, an all party consensus that more environmental and climate protection is needed appears to have a stronger cuing effect than a consensus on the opposite case. Especially participants’ assessment of how pressing it is to take such action is affected by consenting party cues.

Figure 5: Means of pooled dependent variables and Wilcoxon test p-values



* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The figure shows the change in the means for the pooled dependent variables for the con and pro consensus and the disagreement treatment, respectively. The stars indicate the p-value for the Wilcoxon tests of the mean being different from zero.

Finally, again the mechanisms through which multiple party cues influence peoples’ opinions on environmental and climate protection is examined. Therefore, OLS regressions with post-treatment desire for action as dependent variable are run separately for each treatment group (see Table S2.9 in the Online Appendix). Apparently, once there are several cues from different parties instead of just one, respondents do not rely on their knowledge and beliefs so much anymore as hardly any of these seem to have a significant effect on participant’s change in opinion. The only strongly significant effect that is also robust in the regressions with the delta as dependent variable, when adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing and including all respondents (see Tables S2.10, S2.11 and S2.12 in the Online Appendix) is that the more politically interested respondents are, the less

they follow the pro consensus which might be due to politically interested respondents questioning the authenticity of the consensus.

Even the NEP score plays a less relevant role since a higher score only has a positive effect on post-treatment desire for action in the pro consensus case and a negative effect on whether the respondent changes their opinion in the con consensus case (for the probit regressions see Table S2.13 in the Online Appendix). Yet, this shows that participants that are already quite concerned about climate change demand even more climate protection once all parties are agreeing on this to be important while not being so easily persuaded if all parties concur that climate protection is not as relevant. These results are robust to adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing and including all respondents (see Tables S2.14 and S2.15 in the Online Appendix).

4 Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, two studies investigate the public's desire for action on environmental and climate protection due to party cues. In the first study, respondents receive a single statement either labeled as a party cue or general assessment being in favor of or against more environmental and climate protection. In the second study, participants are also confronted with information on parties' stances on this issue however in this case they receive one statement per party. Results show that a pro statement by a single party is effective in changing the public's' opinion on this topic. This effect even increases once more than one party agrees on such a statement. Additionally, unexpected party cues and being uninterested in or denying climate change means being more impressionable and more easily persuaded.

The results of the first study suggest that the party labeled cues tend to be more effective in changing respondents' desire for action with the pro statement overall being the only one that appears to have a significant effect. Only marginally significant effects can be found for the donation decision. Analyzing the desire for action in more detail reveals interesting effects for the sets on adequacy and long term importance of taking action. First of all, in contrast to the other types of questions, both of these scores are significantly impacted regardless of the treatment. Secondly, in the adequacy case the direction of change is always positive, translating to more desire for action, and always negative for the long term score. For adequacy, this might be due to respondents contemplating the current state of action taken to protect the environment and climate regardless of the content of the statement and thus being reminded that more action is generally needed

to fight climate change. For the long term importance, participants might interpret these questions as a trade-off between taking action now and taking action long term. Since they are apparently in favor of more action to be taken currently, as the adequacy score suggests, they are lead to think that long term action is thus less important in comparison.

Results also suggest that respondents generally maintain the status quo, especially so if they have strong opinions on climate change and politics alike. This is in line with the literature on status quo bias (Goodman and Murray, 2007; Tversky and Shafir, 1992).

Looking at the effect of contradicting party cues, i.e. cues that are suggesting the opposite opinion than what the respondent expected this party to have, shows that such an unexpected statement leads to a stronger change in desire for action, even more so if said statement is uttered by a supported rather than an opposed party. Examining these effects in more detail prompts that receiving a contradicting cue from an opposed party - which for most participants means that it is in line with their own beliefs - makes said cue even more convincing. However, such an unexpected statement from a supported party leads respondents to rather question said party instead of their own convictions and therefore not follow the cue. Thus, for a contradicting stance the effect might be stronger than for an anticipated one as suggested by the literature (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). Yet, the change in opinion might not follow the intended direction but rather the opposing one.

Unexpected cues also lead to respondents rather relying on their knowledge and beliefs in a way that is mostly in line with the literature. Firstly, results speak towards the fact that the more participants support some party, the more they are influenced by party cues (Samuels and Zucco Jr, 2014; Carlson, 2016; Barber and Pope, 2019). Secondly, they follow cues more the less they are convinced to know about the truth themselves, because they know less about politics or do not care about it, do not vote or have more trust in parties (Kam, 2005; Barber and Pope, 2019). For trust in people, results are a bit more diverse. Respondents follow con cues from supported parties less and pro cues from opposed parties more, the more they trust people in general. According to Matthes (2013), an explanation for this could be that being more trusting towards people means expecting less negative reactions from others when uttering a deviating opinion and thus rather participating in discussions on political matters. Therefore, such individuals might be more prone to sticking to their opinion, i.e. following the reasoning mentioned for the unexpected cues above.

Finally, especially respondents' environmental concern appears to play a role in their desire for action as it significantly influences whether a change in opinion is made or not. This is even the case for unlabeled cues which is again in line with the literature (Barber and Pope, 2019; Bougher, 2017; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017). Thus, highly concerned individuals are less impressionable than the ones that do not care about or even oppose climate protection.

For the second study, results are in line with the first study meaning that only the pro consensus appears to have a significant effect on desire for action. However, in this case no significant effect can be found for the donation decision. Both consensus treatments significantly affect the opinion on the urgency to take action. Furthermore, the effect sizes for desire for action are bigger in this study than in the first one with 0.2 standard deviations overall for the con and 0.3 for the pro consensus. While this range of effect sizes still appears small, it is in line with similar experiments (Merkley and Stecula, 2021). Furthermore, following the argument of Merkley and Stecula (2021), considering that respondents only got to read three sentences about a widely known and broadly discussed topic they potentially already have a quite consolidated opinion on, finding significant effects is quite remarkable.

Regarding mechanisms behind the change in desire for action, it can be said that respondents appear to rely less on their knowledge and beliefs in these treatments. Being environmentally concerned is also less important than in the first study, yet it leads to respondents demanding even more climate protection once all parties are agreeing on more environmental and climate protection while not being so easily persuaded if all parties concur that this topic is not as relevant.

In conclusion, the fact that people appear to be more impressionable when they receive unexpected cues or are lead to believe that all parties work together to fight climate change, could be used to change the public opinion on climate protection by encouraging a united stance from all parties that care about protecting the environment and climate. This becomes even more important, when considering that people that do not care about or oppose climate protection are most easily persuaded. Despite effect sizes being rather small, finding significant results is still formidable considering the strong and persistent opinions people have on the topic of climate change after years of public discussion and strong polarization as the work by Tschötschel et al. (2021) demonstrates. Additionally, the effect of party cues tends to be rather persistent, making them an important tool in shaping the public opinion (Tappin and Hewitt, 2021).

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Appendix

A Material and Methods

A.1 Donation organizations

For each organization a short description was presented which was taken from the respective (whenever available German) websites of the organizations:

In favor of more climate protection:

Fridays for Future: "Fridays for Future: It refers to everyone that takes the climate protest to the streets. The climate strike movement is organized as an international, non-partisan, independent, and decentralized movement."

BUND (Union for the Protection of the Environment and Nature Germany): "BUND is committed to - for example - ecological agriculture and healthy food, climate protection and the expansion of renewable energies, protecting endangered species, forests and water. It is one of the biggest environmental associations in Germany."

In favor of less climate protection:

EIKE (European Institute for the Climate and Energy): "EIKE is a union of an increasing number of natural, human and economic scientists, engineers, publicists and politicians who regard the claim of a 'man-made climate change' as scientifically unjustifiable and therefore as a lie towards the population. Thus, EIKE rejects any kind of 'climate policy' since it is an excuse to patronize economy and society alike and to burden the population with levies." (Despite its name EIKE is a German lobbying organization)

CFACT (Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow): "CFACT was founded to promote a much-needed, positive alternative voice on issues of environment and development. Its co-founders, David Rothbard and Craig Rucker, strongly believed the power of the market combined with the applications of safe technologies could offer humanity practical solutions to many of the world's most pressing concerns. A number of leading scientists, academics, and policy leaders soon joined them, along with thousands of citizens from around the U.S. and around the world."

A.2 Treatment statements

Study 1

Pro statement: "Despite the current crisis, taking action to protect the environment and climate must not be neglected at the moment. Rebuilding the economy should be combined with such action as this is the only way an intact world can be preserved for subsequent generations."

Con statement: "Counteracting the Corona-crisis and its fatal consequences for humans and the economy is currently more important than taking action to protect the environment and climate. First, the economy has to be rebuilt and people have to be cared for, before we can go on protecting nature again."

Study 2

Pro statements:

AfD: "Our concepts focus on the respective societies, without neglecting the vital dependency on intact natural cycles. Responsibility towards subsequent generations is what we stand for. A healthy environment is the basis of life for all people and future generations."

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: "The only way to overcome the many current crises, is to make the economy future-proof and plead for purposeful investments. Consequent climate protection keeps our planet worth living on."

CDU: "We bank on sustainability: Social, economical and ecological issues have to be newly balanced repeatedly and reconciled with each other. We want to protect the environment and preserve our prosperity at the same time. However, in light of the complex challenges, we also clearly state: We better take an imperfect step towards the right direction than no step at all."

CSU: "The Corona-Crisis must not be used as an excuse to diminish climate protection measures. The question of climate change should be addressed at the same time as fighting the COVID-pandemic, not least due to taking into account the interests of future generations."

Die Linke: "Due to its high greenhouse gas emissions, Germany has a special responsibility to make progress in climate protection. Even in times of the Corona-crisis, the crisis of unbridled exploitation of the environment and climate has to stay in the focus of politics."

SPD: "This year we want to mainly focus on the consequences of the Corona-pandemic. Nevertheless, we may not lose sight of the future. The goal is to combine climate protection with social justice and economic progress. Or in short: Reconcile work and environment."

FDP: "Protection the climate is the biggest challenge of our time. But also the biggest chance. If we start being radically consequent. For us, effective climate protection, social acceptance and economic competitiveness are no opposites but the basis of a sustainable environmental policy."

Con statements:

AfD: "Protecting nature must not happen at the expense of humans. In light of the more and more rapidly expanding Corona virus, especially affected societal groups need fast and effective economic emergency aid. For environmental policy has to first and foremost be guided by national actualities and needs."

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: "Times of crisis are times of collaboration – even between the democratic parliamentary groups and the government. Due to the Corona-pandemic our country and the whole world are facing a challenge without precedent. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that we keep on strengthening our health system and at the same time cushion the economical and social consequences of the Corona-crisis."

CDU: "The Corona-pandemic is a serious situation – for our country and especially for our economy. The central message is: By all means, extensive and profound action is going to be taken to battle this crisis and to strengthen our economy. We bank on reason instead of ideology. Hysteria and excessive desire for action do not help us along."

CSU: "Fighting climate change demands strategy not ideology and the challenge we face due to the current crisis is immense. Thus our approach: Whatever it takes - we do whatever is necessary to overcome this crisis."

Die Linke: "First we defeat Corona. After that we save the climate. Nobody may be left behind during the crisis. We have to secure those people in our society that are affected by income shortages. After overcoming the pandemic, we need to tackle the problems for which we do not have a vaccine."

SPD: "Climate protection is effective if we create optimal conditions for everyone to par-

ticipate. However, our country faces a difficult time due to Corona that keeps us all busy. What counts is a prudent and determined crisis management. Protecting our health is most important! And it is also about keeping the consequences of the crisis to a minimum."

FDP: "With the Corona-crisis we face a very serious situation for our country and our people. It is a threat to our health and our public life and medicinal protection must have first priority here. We need a good plan against an economic crisis after the health crisis and most of all fast, goal oriented and determined actions."

A.3 Validation of credibility and intelligibility of treatment statements

In order to validate the use of the statements the respondents read in both surveys, an online survey was conducted in March of 2021 employing the surveying platform Qualtrics. Two credibility aspects were tested. First, the respondents were asked whether it seemed plausible that the statements were based on some recent quotes¹⁸ from the respective parties and their politicians.¹⁹ After that they had to state whether they perceived the statements as being in favor of more or less action to be taken to protect the environment and climate during the current COVID-19 crisis.²⁰

The sample of 100 participants recruited by respondi was nationally representative of age and gender. A total of 29 respondents were dropped either because they stated low or no effort in answering the questions or answered the full survey in less than 4 minutes which would make it impossible to read all statements and quotes.

For survey 1, the two statements that are either in favor of more environmental and climate protection, hereafter referred to as the pro statement, or against more environmental and climate protection, hereafter referred to as the con statement, were presented in a random order together with some recent quotes from one of the seven parties that are part of the German parliament. For the con statement nine additional participants had to be dropped from the results as the wording of the statement was changed slightly after these first few respondents to improve upon its intelligibility.

¹⁸The oldest employed quotes date back to November of 2019, the latest are from January 2021.

¹⁹This was measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "completely disagree" to "completely agree".

²⁰This was measured via a dummy variable with 0 being "in favor of less action" and 1 "in favor of more action".

The results show that with a mean of 4.07 and 3.30, respectively, both the pro and con statement were overall believed to be based on the given quotes for each party. The only exception was the con statement in connection with the quotes of the party "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen" which had a mean of 2.82, thus being only slightly below the value of 3 which means the respondents were overall indecisive about whether or not the statement could be based on the quotes from this particular party. For the intelligibility of the intention of the statements, it can be said that they were understood in the way they were intended to be, i.e. for the pro statement the mean answer was always below 0.5 and for the con statement always above 0.5 irrespective of the party quotes they were presented together with.

For survey 2, either the pro or con statement written specifically for each party was randomly presented together with recent quotes from the respective party and its politicians. The results are similar to the ones for survey 1 with all statements being overall believed to be based on the presented quotes, i.e. all means were above the value of 3, and again all statements being understood the way they were intended to be, i.e. for the pro statement the mean answer was always below 0.5 and for the con statement always above 0.5.

A.4 Wording of survey items and construction of summary indices

Age: the age of the respondent ranging from 18 to 74 years.

Female: Dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the respondent was female and 0 otherwise.

Number of children: Dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the respondent has children and 0 otherwise.

Place of residence: Dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the respondent lives in a major city and 0 otherwise.

Monthly net income: Coded as the mean of the monthly net income section the respondent selected to be in.

University degree: Dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the respondent obtained a uni-

versity degree and 0 otherwise.

Political interest: Measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 "Very little" to 5 "Very much".

Own political orientation: Measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 "left" to 10 "right"

Support for favorite party: Measured on a thermometer scale from -5 for +5. The favorite party is determined by the respondent's selection of their favorite party.

Support for treatment party: Measured on a thermometer scale from -5 for +5.

Political knowledge score: The amount of correct answers to nine political knowledge questions.

Sustainability score: The mean answer to ten question on own sustainable behavior measured on a 5-point Likert scale.

NEP score: The mean answer to the 15 questions of the revised NEP scale by Dunlap et al. (2000) measured on a 5-point Likert scale.

Climate change knowledge score: The amount of correct answers to seven questions on climate change.

Trusting people in general: Measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 "Distrust a lot" to 5 "Trust a lot".

Trusting parties: Measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 "Distrust a lot" to 5 "Trust a lot".

Respondent would vote: Dummy variable that is coded as 1 if respondent would vote in the next national election and 0 otherwise.

Duration: Time it took the respondent to answer the survey measured in seconds.

Effort in answering: Measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 "None" to 5 "Very much".


S1 Study 1

S1.1 Control variables

Control variables include personal data, i.e. gender, age, number of children, educational level, place of residence and birth country, as well as information on political interest and orientation, political and climate change knowledge, own sustainable behavior and beliefs about environmental change, overall trust and trust in parties, support of ones favorite party, dummies for the treatment parties and the parties the respondents voted for and the duration of answering the questionnaire as well as self reported effort in answering it. Income was not used as a control variable as 115 people, i.e. six percent of the sample, did not answer this question, thus the sample size would have decreased remarkably, while the effect of this variable is negligible (see Table S1.4). For more details on all variables see section A.4 in the Online Appendix.

S1.2 Tables and figures

Figure S1.1: Distribution of answers before treatment



Notes. Organizations against more climate protection: EIKE = "Europäisches Institut für Klima und Energie", CFACT = "Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow"; Organizations in favor of more climate protection: BUND = "Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland", FFF = "Fridays for Future".

Table S1.1: Summary statistics by treatment group

	con x no label		con x label		pro x no label		pro x label	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Female (D)	0.44	(0.50)	0.52	(0.50)	0.57	(0.50)	0.51	(0.50)
Age	47.30	(14.24)	46.27	(15.52)	46.14	(15.59)	46.07	(15.27)
Monthly net income	2174.29	(1492.94)	2013.61	(1341.85)	1943.53	(1241.14)	2000.42	(1297.73)
University degree (D)	0.24	(0.43)	0.30	(0.46)	0.23	(0.42)	0.28	(0.45)
Political interest	3.41	(1.08)	3.36	(1.04)	3.29	(0.85)	3.40	(1.00)
Own political orientation (left-right)	5.26	(1.99)	5.05	(1.64)	5.26	(1.50)	5.13	(1.63)
Political knowledge score	5.37	(2.50)	5.53	(2.46)	5.00	(2.41)	5.40	(2.44)
Sustainability score	3.10	(0.71)	3.11	(0.74)	3.15	(0.65)	3.18	(0.69)
NEP score	3.84	(0.61)	3.88	(0.57)	3.94	(0.55)	3.90	(0.52)
Climate change knowledge score	4.12	(1.99)	4.44	(1.82)	4.42	(1.72)	4.60	(1.65)
Observations	113		848		119		923	

Table S1.2: Wilcoxon tests for main dependent variable and all respondents

	Desire for action		Donations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	con	pro	con	pro
Rank Sum (no label/label)	0.916 (-0.105)	0.344 (-0.946)	0.916 (-0.105)	0.344 (-0.946)
Signed-Rank (no label)	0.734 (0.340)	0.322 (0.990)	0.851 (-0.188)	0.639 (0.469)
Signed-Rank (label)	0.175 (1.357)	0.000 (5.164)	0.073 (1.791)	0.643 (0.463)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses.

Table S1.3: OLS estimation results for treatment groups (delta)

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Desire for action (delta)	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World	Donations
pro	0.089 (0.054)	0.063 (0.067)	-0.004 (0.057)	0.034 (0.050)	0.091 (0.048)	0.023 (0.052)	0.790 (1.881)
label	0.011 (0.053)	-0.037 (0.072)	-0.039 (0.067)	-0.018 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.049)	-0.041 (0.057)	-0.683 (1.916)
pro x label	-0.057 (0.059)	0.071 (0.075)	0.051 (0.065)	0.028 (0.054)	-0.032 (0.054)	0.070 (0.057)	-0.442 (2.085)
Constant	0.169 (0.223)	-0.870 (0.393)	-0.306 (0.173)	-0.656 (0.280)	-0.331 (0.225)	-0.020 (0.334)	13.528 (7.590)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	1995
R ²	0.060	0.078	0.053	0.071	0.064	0.078	0.053

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. All included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S1.4: OLS estimation results for treatment groups with income variable (delta)

Dependent variable: Desire for action (delta)	(1) Adequacy	(2) Urgency	(3) Long Term	(4) Self	(5) Gov	(6) World	(7) Donations
pro	0.096 (0.057)	0.031 (0.066)	-0.005 (0.056)	0.017 (0.048)	0.094 (0.046)	0.012 (0.053)	0.953 (1.896)
label	0.018 (0.055)	-0.057 (0.072)	-0.021 (0.069)	-0.025 (0.051)	0.001 (0.048)	-0.035 (0.058)	-1.357 (1.908)
pro × label	-0.056 (0.062)	0.120 (0.074)	0.065 (0.063)	0.058 (0.051)	-0.022 (0.052)	0.093 (0.058)	-0.217 (2.079)
Monthly net income	0.004 (0.012)	0.009 (0.016)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.019 (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)	0.072 (0.426)
Constant	0.297 (0.218)	-0.628 (0.334)	-0.219 (0.155)	-0.486 (0.218)	-0.223 (0.188)	0.159 (0.341)	13.050 (8.132)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1888	1888	1888	1888	1888	1888	1880
R^2	0.060	0.081	0.058	0.075	0.069	0.081	0.061

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. All included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. The income variable is standardized. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S1.5: Marginal effects for OLS estimation results for treatment groups (delta)

Dependent variable: Desire for action (delta)	(1) Adequacy	(2) Urgency	(3) Long Term	(4) Self	(5) Gov	(6) World	(7) Donations
con × no label	0.002 (0.040)	-0.022 (0.054)	-0.095 (0.039)	-0.041 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.035 (0.040)	0.586 (1.466)
con × label	0.049 (0.019)	-0.058 (0.023)	-0.088 (0.022)	-0.030 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.062 (0.018)	0.718 (0.760)
pro × no label	0.091 (0.033)	0.041 (0.037)	-0.098 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.031)	0.053 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.035)	1.376 (1.286)
pro × label	0.082 (0.015)	0.077 (0.019)	-0.041 (0.016)	0.031 (0.013)	0.055 (0.015)	0.033 (0.015)	1.162 (0.601)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	1995

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. Except for treatment party dummies, all controls listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S1.6: Marginal effects for OLS estimation results for treatment groups and all respondents (delta)

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Desire for action (delta)	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World	Donations
con × no label	0.067 (0.036)	-0.044 (0.055)	-0.123 (0.042)	-0.012 (0.039)	-0.039 (0.036)	-0.049 (0.033)	0.693 (1.320)
con × label	0.068 (0.018)	-0.047 (0.022)	-0.075 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.017)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.051 (0.017)	0.801 (0.625)
pro × no label	0.073 (0.031)	0.026 (0.035)	-0.083 (0.046)	-0.025 (0.034)	0.064 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.033)	1.196 (1.178)
pro × label	0.084 (0.014)	0.068 (0.018)	-0.051 (0.017)	0.013 (0.013)	0.048 (0.015)	0.040 (0.014)	0.860 (0.519)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2487

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. Except for treatment party dummies, all controls listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S1.7: Wilcoxon tests for treatment groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World
Rank Sum (con x no label/label)	0.626 (-0.488)	0.944 (-0.071)	0.842 (-0.199)	0.891 (-0.137)	0.210 (-1.254)	0.632 (0.479)
Rank Sum (pro x no label/label)	0.954 (0.058)	0.913 (-0.109)	0.503 (-0.670)	0.139 (-1.481)	0.581 (0.552)	0.329 (-0.977)
Signed-Rank (con x no label)	0.431 (0.787)	0.749 (-0.319)	0.084 (-1.726)	0.636 (-0.473)	0.383 (-0.873)	0.880 (-0.151)
Signed-Rank (con x label)	0.001 (3.429)	0.514 (-0.652)	0.000 (-4.381)	0.348 (-0.938)	0.203 (1.272)	0.063 (-1.861)
Signed-Rank (pro x no label)	0.011 (2.557)	0.100 (1.645)	0.081 (-1.744)	0.718 (-0.362)	0.015 (2.423)	0.998 (0.003)
Signed-Rank (pro x label)	0.000 (5.990)	0.000 (4.944)	0.001 (-3.183)	0.001 (3.206)	0.000 (4.705)	0.003 (2.979)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses.

Table S1.8: Marginal effects for all party labels separately (delta)

Dependent variable: Desire for action (delta)	(1) Adequacy	(2) Urgency	(3) Long Term	(4) Self	(5) Gov	(6) World	(7) Donations
con × AfD	0.032 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.052)	-0.009 (0.046)	-0.036 (0.038)	0.037 (0.039)	0.021 (0.037)	0.081 (1.862)
con × Die Grünen	0.062 (0.057)	-0.010 (0.061)	-0.166 (0.047)	-0.034 (0.045)	-0.016 (0.046)	-0.063 (0.046)	-0.203 (1.270)
con × CDU	0.083 (0.062)	-0.098 (0.072)	-0.061 (0.051)	-0.055 (0.052)	0.022 (0.053)	-0.042 (0.051)	0.166 (1.511)
con × Die Linke	0.019 (0.051)	-0.131 (0.076)	-0.091 (0.058)	-0.080 (0.044)	-0.007 (0.055)	-0.115 (0.054)	5.691 (2.100)
con × FDP	0.128 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.043)	0.010 (0.046)	0.097 (0.033)	0.010 (0.036)	0.007 (0.034)	0.206 (1.334)
con × SPD	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.047 (0.076)	-0.197 (0.091)	-0.031 (0.055)	-0.089 (0.059)	-0.132 (0.069)	-0.433 (1.601)
con × CSU	0.024 (0.045)	-0.095 (0.066)	-0.109 (0.055)	-0.070 (0.044)	0.005 (0.049)	-0.114 (0.050)	-0.098 (2.480)
con × None	0.002 (0.040)	-0.022 (0.054)	-0.095 (0.039)	-0.041 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.040)	0.580 (1.470)
pro × AfD	0.101 (0.039)	0.037 (0.051)	-0.043 (0.031)	0.049 (0.032)	0.018 (0.033)	0.028 (0.035)	0.873 (1.672)
pro × Die Grünen	0.084 (0.040)	0.100 (0.047)	-0.073 (0.040)	0.031 (0.031)	0.039 (0.037)	0.041 (0.032)	2.609 (1.561)
pro × CDU	0.097 (0.043)	0.198 (0.060)	-0.098 (0.047)	0.061 (0.042)	0.076 (0.047)	0.060 (0.053)	1.819 (1.420)
pro × Die Linke	0.127 (0.043)	0.071 (0.046)	-0.024 (0.029)	0.018 (0.030)	0.092 (0.030)	0.064 (0.029)	1.634 (1.329)
pro × FDP	0.066 (0.041)	0.049 (0.058)	0.024 (0.051)	0.053 (0.041)	0.089 (0.054)	-0.002 (0.032)	-0.410 (1.123)
pro × SPD	0.064 (0.046)	0.064 (0.061)	-0.028 (0.039)	-0.025 (0.037)	0.057 (0.040)	0.069 (0.042)	0.557 (1.282)
pro × CSU	0.024 (0.044)	0.013 (0.052)	-0.040 (0.034)	0.031 (0.037)	0.009 (0.034)	-0.043 (0.043)	0.840 (2.432)
pro × None	0.091 (0.034)	0.041 (0.037)	-0.099 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.031)	0.053 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.035)	1.370 (1.290)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	1995

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. Except for treatment party dummies, all controls listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S1.9: Effect of unexpected cue, OLS Regressions (delta)

Dependent variable: Desire for action (delta)	Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1) con x label	(2) pro x label	(3) con x label	(4) pro x label
Unexpected cue (D)	0.127 (0.079)	-0.009 (0.048)	0.033 (0.044)	0.097 (0.040)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	314	353	410	425
R^2	0.138	0.047	0.127	0.134

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include all control variables listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix as well as support for treatment party. The "unexpected cue" dummy is equal to 0 if the cue is anticipated and 1 otherwise. A cue is considered anticipated if it is in line with how important the respondent expected climate change to be for the treatment party, i.e. if the cue is pro and the party is expected to care about climate change or vice versa.

Table S1.10: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables

Dependent variable:	No label		Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	con x no label	pro x no label	con x label	pro x label	con x label	pro x label
University degree (D)	0.087 (0.096)	0.034 (0.056)	-0.008 (0.058)	0.027 (0.043)	0.041 (0.042)	-0.012 (0.029)
Political interest	0.019 (0.043)	-0.058 (0.036)	0.069 (0.033)	-0.014 (0.022)	0.005 (0.024)	0.012 (0.024)
Own political orientation (left-right)	-0.059 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.016)	0.008 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.019)
Support for favorite party	0.065 (0.039)	0.003 (0.030)	0.096 (0.044)	-0.016 (0.031)	0.019 (0.024)	0.034 (0.016)
Political knowledge score	0.001 (0.050)	-0.019 (0.039)	-0.015 (0.033)	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.031 (0.018)
Sustainability score	0.033 (0.035)	0.002 (0.030)	0.003 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.017 (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)
NEP score	0.046 (0.043)	0.099 (0.060)	0.111 (0.039)	0.076 (0.029)	0.101 (0.020)	0.067 (0.035)
Climate change knowledge score	0.008 (0.046)	0.072 (0.029)	-0.029 (0.027)	0.005 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.024)
Trusting people in general	0.003 (0.038)	0.025 (0.032)	0.070 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.017)	0.024 (0.017)	0.057 (0.018)
Trusting parties	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.038 (0.028)	-0.072 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.017)
Respondent would vote (D)	-0.044 (0.146)	0.150 (0.132)	-0.139 (0.112)	0.115 (0.069)	-0.089 (0.059)	-0.139 (0.071)
Support for treatment party			-0.194 (0.069)	0.044 (0.043)	-0.024 (0.043)	-0.011 (0.037)
Constant	0.806 (0.411)	0.610 (0.353)	1.181 (0.382)	0.491 (0.225)	0.485 (0.225)	0.681 (0.245)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	119	314	353	410	425
R^2	0.903	0.917	0.825	0.868	0.911	0.908

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional to pre-treatment desire for action, remaining included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S1.11: OLS estimation p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing

Dependent variable:	No label		Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	con x no label	pro x no label	con x label	pro x label	con x label	pro x label
University degree (D)	0.398	0.560	0.898	0.573	0.343	0.679
Political interest	0.666	0.108	0.057	0.523	0.835	0.625
Own pol. orientation (left-right)	0.098	0.700	0.259	0.273	0.673	0.639
Support for favorite party	0.124	0.918	0.048	0.577	0.465	0.042
Political knowledge score	0.989	0.630	0.657	0.495	0.735	0.096
Sustainability score	0.368	0.930	0.927	0.910	0.422	0.650
NEP score	0.288	0.129	0.013	0.018	0.000	0.078
Climate change knowledge score	0.874	0.017	0.295	0.843	0.827	0.279
Trusting people in general	0.930	0.436	0.020	0.210	0.189	0.003
Trusting parties	0.649	0.179	0.021	0.524	0.627	0.256
Respondent would vote (D)	0.777	0.305	0.234	0.105	0.153	0.081
Support for treatment party			0.013	0.305	0.592	0.785
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional to pre-treatment desire for action, remaining included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized. Adjusted p-values are calculated using a bootstrap with 10,000 replications and employing the Stata module mhtreg developed by Andreas Steinmayr (link: <https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458853.html>).

Table S1.12: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables (delta)

Dependent variable:	No label		Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Desire for action (delta)	con x no label	pro x no label	con x label	pro x label	con x label	pro x label
University degree (D)	0.056 (0.104)	0.045 (0.058)	-0.013 (0.058)	0.020 (0.044)	0.041 (0.042)	-0.006 (0.029)
Political interest	0.004 (0.045)	-0.048 (0.041)	0.066 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.021)	0.009 (0.025)	0.016 (0.023)
Own political orientation (left-right)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.016 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.019)
Support for favorite party	0.063 (0.041)	-0.006 (0.029)	0.081 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.033)	0.014 (0.024)	0.038 (0.016)
Political knowledge score	0.011 (0.055)	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.034)	-0.014 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.031 (0.018)
Sustainability score	0.025 (0.038)	-0.020 (0.030)	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.018)	0.013 (0.020)	0.004 (0.020)
NEP score	-0.040 (0.038)	0.016 (0.043)	0.029 (0.025)	0.029 (0.024)	0.062 (0.019)	0.031 (0.026)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.040 (0.043)	0.048 (0.031)	-0.057 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.017)	-0.038 (0.024)
Trusting people in general	-0.035 (0.039)	0.012 (0.031)	0.070 (0.029)	-0.024 (0.016)	0.020 (0.019)	0.051 (0.017)
Trusting parties	-0.021 (0.045)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.089 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.017)
Respondent would vote (D)	0.033 (0.143)	0.149 (0.151)	-0.130 (0.120)	0.115 (0.072)	-0.087 (0.060)	-0.137 (0.072)
Support for treatment party			-0.202 (0.072)	0.033 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.043)	-0.026 (0.036)
Constant	-0.347 (0.231)	-0.302 (0.193)	0.255 (0.201)	-0.059 (0.144)	0.004 (0.129)	0.302 (0.120)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	119	314	353	410	425
R^2	0.228	0.208	0.127	0.044	0.117	0.109

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Remaining included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S1.13: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables and all respondents

Dependent variable:	No label		Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	con x no label	pro x no label	con x label	pro x label	con x label	pro x label
University degree (D)	0.038 (0.075)	0.062 (0.053)	-0.034 (0.051)	0.007 (0.042)	0.019 (0.039)	-0.003 (0.029)
Political interest	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.020 (0.031)	0.043 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.028)	0.014 (0.018)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.031)	-0.025 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.001 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.016)
Support for favorite party	0.040 (0.036)	0.001 (0.028)	0.107 (0.042)	-0.020 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.024)	0.020 (0.017)
Political knowledge score	0.048 (0.042)	-0.025 (0.034)	-0.005 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.043 (0.018)
Sustainability score	0.034 (0.031)	0.011 (0.028)	0.041 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.017)	0.041 (0.024)	0.022 (0.019)
NEP score	0.097 (0.049)	0.097 (0.050)	0.100 (0.034)	0.053 (0.028)	0.096 (0.021)	0.038 (0.026)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.010 (0.039)	0.073 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.025)	0.024 (0.027)	0.009 (0.020)	0.004 (0.021)
Trusting people in general	-0.023 (0.026)	0.025 (0.028)	0.053 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.016)	0.021 (0.017)	0.038 (0.016)
Trusting parties	0.000 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.031)	-0.056 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.016)
Respondent would vote (D)	-0.135 (0.130)	0.067 (0.118)	-0.103 (0.106)	0.088 (0.068)	0.045 (0.096)	-0.122 (0.066)
Support for treatment party			-0.165 (0.057)	0.043 (0.042)	-0.048 (0.037)	0.021 (0.035)
Constant	0.784 (0.365)	0.720 (0.308)	1.133 (0.331)	0.411 (0.207)	0.514 (0.244)	0.526 (0.200)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	156	141	400	394	520	547
R^2	0.882	0.926	0.827	0.875	0.878	0.894

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional to pre-treatment desire for action, remaining included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S1.14: Probit estimation marginal effects for additional explanatory variables

Dependent variable: Desire for action (change dummy)	No label		Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1) con x no label	(2) pro x no label	(3) con x label	(4) pro x label	(5) con x label	(6) pro x label
University degree (D)	-0.114 (0.081)	-0.107 (0.081)	0.035 (0.052)	-0.046 (0.051)	-0.048 (0.048)	-0.055 (0.040)
Political interest	-0.064 (0.045)	0.021 (0.056)	-0.053 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.016 (0.028)	0.032 (0.023)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.002 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.047)	0.022 (0.024)	0.019 (0.023)	0.009 (0.024)	0.021 (0.022)
Support for favorite party	0.004 (0.040)	-0.073 (0.043)	-0.061 (0.038)	0.020 (0.036)	0.029 (0.017)	0.036 (0.016)
Political knowledge score	0.056 (0.051)	0.028 (0.047)	0.010 (0.028)	-0.069 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.026)	-0.066 (0.025)
Sustainability score	0.080 (0.042)	-0.056 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.023)	0.018 (0.024)	0.021 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.024)
NEP score	-0.067 (0.044)	-0.151 (0.054)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.064 (0.026)	-0.090 (0.021)	-0.043 (0.026)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.045 (0.038)	0.009 (0.052)	0.016 (0.025)	0.038 (0.026)	0.027 (0.024)	0.032 (0.021)
Trusting people in general	-0.013 (0.045)	-0.031 (0.048)	0.016 (0.026)	-0.041 (0.020)	0.015 (0.019)	0.009 (0.020)
Trusting parties	0.016 (0.044)	-0.064 (0.043)	0.015 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.029 (0.020)
Support for treatment party			0.095 (0.062)	0.030 (0.060)	-0.016 (0.051)	-0.037 (0.041)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	115	314	353	410	425

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Except for the respondent's voting decision, all controls listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The "change dummy" is 1 if the respondent changed their answer to one of the desire for action questions from before to after the treatment and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S1.15: Probit estimation marginal effects for additional explanatory variables and all respondents

Dependent variable: Desire for action (change dummy)	No label		Supports treatment party		Opposes treatment party	
	(1) con x no label	(2) pro x no label	(3) con x label	(4) pro x label	(5) con x label	(6) pro x label
University degree (D)	-0.040 (0.073)	-0.097 (0.077)	0.009 (0.045)	-0.067 (0.045)	-0.049 (0.043)	-0.066 (0.038)
Political interest	-0.012 (0.036)	-0.020 (0.056)	-0.064 (0.026)	0.005 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.024)	0.006 (0.020)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.023 (0.024)	0.014 (0.043)	0.003 (0.021)	0.026 (0.023)	0.005 (0.020)	0.030 (0.020)
Support for favorite party	0.035 (0.036)	-0.066 (0.044)	-0.076 (0.036)	0.008 (0.029)	0.024 (0.014)	0.036 (0.015)
Political knowledge score	-0.014 (0.040)	-0.022 (0.046)	0.012 (0.026)	-0.063 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.049 (0.023)
Sustainability score	0.057 (0.039)	-0.013 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.020)	0.023 (0.022)	0.023 (0.018)	0.013 (0.020)
NEP score	-0.029 (0.035)	-0.132 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.068 (0.024)	-0.078 (0.017)	-0.042 (0.022)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.031 (0.034)	0.034 (0.045)	0.031 (0.023)	0.024 (0.025)	0.009 (0.021)	0.044 (0.020)
Trusting people in general	-0.036 (0.036)	-0.038 (0.047)	0.022 (0.023)	-0.049 (0.019)	0.014 (0.017)	0.013 (0.018)
Trusting parties	0.022 (0.031)	-0.026 (0.045)	0.005 (0.024)	0.001 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.018)	-0.037 (0.018)
Support for treatment party			0.080 (0.057)	0.040 (0.054)	-0.007 (0.045)	0.023 (0.040)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	156	135	400	394	520	547

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Except for the respondent's voting decision, all controls listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The "change dummy" is 1 if the respondent changed their answer to one of the desire for action questions from before to after the treatment and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

S1.3 Separate results for all outcome variables

Table S1.16: Wilcoxon tests for treatment groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
con x no label vs. label	0.394 (-0.853)	0.187 (-1.320)	0.623 (0.492)	0.818 (-0.230)	0.274 (-1.094)	0.095 (1.672)	0.706 (-0.377)	0.336 (0.963)	0.277 (-1.088)	0.907 (-0.117)
pro x no label vs. label	0.534 (-0.621)	0.832 (-0.212)	0.401 (0.840)	0.454 (-0.749)	0.192 (1.305)	0.523 (-0.638)	0.594 (-0.533)	0.963 (0.046)	0.201 (-1.279)	0.394 (0.852)
Signed-Rank (con x no label)	0.782 (-0.277)	0.581 (0.552)	0.820 (0.228)	0.956 (-0.055)	0.103 (-1.630)	0.477 (0.711)	0.038 (-2.078)	0.736 (-0.337)	0.094 (-1.674)	0.598 (0.527)
Signed-Rank (con x label)	0.084 (1.729)	0.000 (5.148)	0.410 (-0.825)	0.619 (0.497)	0.094 (-1.674)	0.006 (-2.773)	0.000 (-4.637)	0.000 (-3.630)	0.157 (-1.414)	0.082 (1.738)
Signed-Rank (pro x no label)	0.104 (1.628)	0.014 (2.454)	0.261 (1.123)	0.773 (0.289)	0.008 (2.647)	0.581 (0.553)	0.068 (-1.824)	0.292 (-1.054)	0.276 (-1.090)	0.195 (1.295)
Signed-Rank (pro x label)	0.000 (5.464)	0.000 (6.304)	0.560 (0.583)	0.004 (2.874)	0.000 (3.787)	0.000 (3.502)	0.000 (-3.799)	0.004 (-2.887)	0.571 (0.567)	0.405 (0.832)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses. Test for: (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation.

Table S1.17: Wilcoxon tests for treatment groups by party (con statements)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rank Sum										
AfD	0.730 (-0.345)	0.649 (-0.455)	0.869 (0.166)	0.828 (0.217)	0.045 (-2.005)	0.851 (0.187)	0.273 (-1.097)	0.979 (0.026)	0.012 (-2.508)	0.790 (-0.266)
Grüne	0.343 (-0.948)	0.056 (-1.910)	0.749 (0.320)	0.686 (0.404)	0.357 (-0.922)	0.601 (0.524)	0.459 (0.741)	0.098 (1.656)	0.923 (0.097)	0.816 (0.233)
CDU	0.394 (-0.852)	0.120 (-1.556)	0.818 (0.230)	0.939 (-0.077)	0.669 (-0.428)	0.204 (1.269)	0.688 (0.402)	0.655 (0.446)	0.185 (-1.327)	0.731 (0.344)
CSU	0.881 (-0.150)	0.132 (-1.508)	0.411 (0.822)	0.987 (-0.016)	0.279 (-1.082)	0.096 (1.667)	0.974 (-0.033)	0.249 (1.153)	0.658 (-0.442)	0.585 (-0.546)
Linke	0.815 (-0.234)	0.544 (-0.606)	0.137 (1.486)	0.239 (1.176)	0.578 (-0.556)	0.053 (1.935)	0.923 (-0.096)	0.207 (1.262)	0.892 (-0.135)	0.160 (-1.405)
FDP	0.017 (-2.393)	0.084 (-1.729)	0.454 (-0.748)	0.154 (-1.427)	0.863 (0.173)	0.296 (1.044)	0.144 (-1.459)	0.747 (-0.323)	0.163 (-1.396)	0.802 (0.250)
SPD	0.833 (0.211)	0.445 (0.764)	0.703 (0.381)	0.130 (-1.514)	0.375 (-0.886)	0.033 (2.129)	0.705 (-0.379)	0.307 (1.022)	0.937 (-0.079)	0.427 (0.795)
Signed-Rank										
AfD	0.836 (0.207)	0.220 (1.226)	1.000 (0.000)	0.704 (-0.380)	0.241 (1.173)	0.493 (0.686)	0.584 (-0.547)	0.685 (-0.406)	0.059 (1.886)	0.409 (0.825)
Grüne	0.334 (0.966)	0.007 (2.693)	0.821 (-0.226)	0.553 (-0.594)	0.636 (-0.473)	0.976 (0.030)	0.003 (-2.980)	0.010 (-2.569)	0.082 (-1.741)	0.820 (0.228)
CDU	0.427 (0.794)	0.012 (2.511)	0.945 (-0.069)	0.993 (0.009)	0.312 (-1.012)	0.281 (-1.078)	0.011 (-2.542)	0.312 (-1.012)	0.854 (0.184)	0.970 (0.038)
CSU	0.941 (-0.074)	0.007 (2.713)	0.305 (-1.026)	0.972 (-0.036)	0.717 (-0.362)	0.088 (-1.705)	0.007 (-2.711)	0.028 (-2.195)	0.178 (-1.347)	0.247 (1.158)
Linke	0.948 (0.065)	0.140 (1.476)	0.027 (-2.216)	0.136 (-1.490)	0.309 (-1.018)	0.040 (-2.052)	0.032 (-2.141)	0.044 (-2.013)	0.142 (-1.467)	0.011 (2.541)
FDP	0.004 (2.852)	0.002 (3.112)	0.128 (1.521)	0.042 (2.030)	0.016 (-2.409)	0.442 (-0.769)	0.966 (-0.043)	0.901 (0.124)	0.752 (0.316)	0.863 (0.173)
SPD	0.644 (-0.462)	0.606 (-0.516)	0.746 (-0.324)	0.029 (2.184)	0.685 (-0.406)	0.017 (-2.389)	0.123 (-1.542)	0.104 (-1.624)	0.181 (-1.338)	0.572 (-0.564)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses. Test for: (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation.

Table S1.18: Wilcoxon tests for treatment groups by party (pro statements)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rank Sum										
AfD	0.313 (-1.009)	0.534 (-0.622)	0.710 (0.372)	0.491 (-0.689)	0.115 (1.574)	0.973 (0.033)	0.620 (-0.495)	0.596 (0.530)	0.273 (-1.096)	0.105 (1.622)
Grüne	0.437 (-0.777)	0.482 (-0.702)	0.277 (1.088)	0.209 (-1.256)	0.164 (1.391)	0.095 (-1.667)	0.828 (0.217)	0.199 (1.283)	0.326 (-0.983)	0.490 (-0.690)
CDU	0.658 (-0.443)	0.490 (-0.691)	0.916 (-0.105)	0.035 (-2.106)	0.349 (-0.937)	0.645 (-0.460)	0.978 (0.027)	0.472 (0.720)	0.478 (-0.710)	0.328 (0.979)
CSU	0.888 (-0.140)	0.770 (0.292)	0.078 (1.765)	0.619 (0.498)	0.037 (2.084)	0.741 (0.331)	0.414 (-0.816)	0.878 (0.154)	0.640 (-0.467)	0.271 (1.101)
Linke	0.758 (0.308)	0.230 (-1.199)	0.617 (-0.501)	0.620 (-0.496)	0.351 (0.932)	0.648 (-0.457)	0.481 (-0.705)	0.561 (-0.581)	0.423 (-0.802)	0.555 (0.590)
FDP	0.149 (-1.444)	0.679 (0.414)	0.077 (1.770)	0.943 (0.071)	0.124 (1.539)	0.949 (-0.064)	0.366 (-0.904)	0.230 (-1.200)	0.106 (-1.616)	0.313 (1.009)
SPD	0.952 (-0.060)	0.117 (1.566)	0.728 (0.348)	0.929 (0.089)	0.636 (0.474)	0.305 (-1.025)	0.825 (-0.221)	0.462 (-0.736)	0.266 (-1.112)	0.908 (0.115)
Signed-Rank										
AfD	0.003 (2.923)	0.001 (3.237)	0.479 (0.708)	0.176 (1.353)	0.685 (0.406)	0.499 (0.676)	0.086 (-1.717)	0.076 (-1.774)	0.672 (0.423)	0.299 (-1.039)
Grüne	0.015 (2.444)	0.003 (3.005)	0.772 (-0.290)	0.039 (2.064)	0.438 (0.776)	0.002 (3.087)	0.016 (-2.408)	0.005 (-2.782)	0.799 (0.255)	0.028 (2.192)
CDU	0.039 (2.065)	0.004 (2.881)	0.197 (1.291)	0.003 (2.931)	0.000 (3.848)	0.242 (1.170)	0.074 (-1.785)	0.050 (-1.960)	0.939 (-0.076)	0.871 (-0.162)
CSU	0.166 (1.386)	0.088 (1.706)	0.167 (-1.383)	0.704 (-0.379)	0.958 (-0.053)	0.879 (0.153)	0.509 (-0.660)	0.196 (-1.294)	0.602 (-0.521)	0.717 (-0.362)
Linke	0.285 (1.070)	0.000 (3.929)	0.079 (1.757)	0.333 (0.968)	0.081 (1.742)	0.191 (1.307)	0.192 (-1.305)	0.630 (-0.482)	0.833 (-0.211)	0.651 (0.453)
FDP	0.002 (3.110)	0.155 (1.422)	0.160 (-1.403)	0.822 (0.225)	0.458 (0.741)	0.459 (0.741)	0.551 (-0.596)	0.474 (0.715)	0.226 (1.210)	0.953 (-0.059)
SPD	0.125 (1.535)	0.822 (0.225)	0.440 (0.772)	0.895 (0.132)	0.024 (2.264)	0.051 (1.954)	0.104 (-1.625)	0.983 (-0.021)	0.658 (0.443)	0.237 (1.181)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses. Test for: (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation.

Table S1.19: OLS estimation results for treatment groups (con statements)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Party label	0.068 (0.049)	0.099 (0.062)	-0.027 (0.070)	-0.060 (0.082)	0.058 (0.073)	-0.103 (0.081)	0.028 (0.066)	-0.057 (0.057)	0.051 (0.046)	0.132 (1.711)
Constant	-0.189 (0.780)	-0.063 (0.823)	0.851 (1.068)	1.207 (1.562)	-2.977 (1.302)	-1.353 (1.805)	0.922 (0.666)	2.021 (0.667)	0.554 (0.417)	-14.346 (16.094)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	961	961	961	961	961	961	961	961	961	958

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. All included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S1.20: OLS estimation results for treatment groups (pro statements)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Party label	0.032 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.061)	-0.058 (0.059)	0.023 (0.062)	0.002 (0.052)	0.085 (0.052)	0.060 (0.068)	0.006 (0.048)	0.107 (0.068)	-0.213 (1.419)
Constant	-0.824 (0.771)	-1.027 (0.601)	0.119 (0.776)	0.706 (0.856)	-0.979 (0.679)	-0.371 (0.633)	-0.653 (0.723)	-0.831 (0.470)	-0.426 (0.597)	17.815 (12.421)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1037

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. All included controls are listed in section S1.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S1.21: Comparison of groups that are considered least likely to deviate in their opinion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rank sum (no interest/interest)	0.946 (-0.068)	0.091 (-1.689)	0.195 (-1.295)	0.949 (0.063)	0.800 (0.253)	0.282 (-1.076)	0.822 (0.225)	0.732 (-0.342)	0.201 (-1.277)	0.274 (-1.094)
Signed-Rank (no interest)	0.936 (-0.080)	0.004 (2.877)	0.449 (-0.756)	0.457 (0.744)	0.213 (1.245)	0.443 (-0.767)	0.001 (-3.480)	0.016 (-2.409)	0.011 (-2.545)	0.002 (3.094)
Signed-Rank (interest)	0.972 (0.035)	0.004 (2.870)	0.219 (1.230)	0.738 (0.335)	0.753 (0.315)	0.248 (1.155)	0.107 (-1.612)	0.509 (-0.660)	0.317 (1.000)	0.014 (2.448)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses. Test for: (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation.

Table S1.22: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables (con statements)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Unexpected cue (D)	-0.107 (0.068)	0.066 (0.085)	0.095 (0.085)	0.186 (0.089)	0.132 (0.097)	0.132 (0.111)	0.055 (0.079)	0.126 (0.081)	0.119 (0.072)	-1.006 (1.783)
Support for treatment party	0.005 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.033)	0.022 (0.033)	-0.063 (0.038)	-0.076 (0.044)	-0.041 (0.042)	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.037)	-0.026 (0.030)	0.280 (0.606)
Female (D)	0.009 (0.051)	0.047 (0.057)	0.083 (0.054)	-0.069 (0.065)	-0.145 (0.071)	-0.130 (0.078)	0.028 (0.063)	-0.006 (0.064)	0.055 (0.061)	1.360 (1.498)
Age	0.009 (0.027)	0.040 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.033)	0.022 (0.035)	0.032 (0.035)	0.044 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.033)	-0.023 (0.032)	0.012 (0.024)	-0.529 (0.795)
Children (D)	-0.017 (0.050)	-0.191 (0.061)	-0.005 (0.056)	-0.138 (0.061)	-0.221 (0.061)	-0.252 (0.077)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.117 (0.054)	-0.092 (0.055)	-1.027 (1.486)
Living in a major city (D)	-0.062 (0.050)	-0.071 (0.057)	0.065 (0.061)	0.052 (0.064)	-0.016 (0.055)	0.005 (0.061)	0.005 (0.053)	0.036 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.041)	-1.156 (1.291)
Germany is country of birth (D)	0.146 (0.103)	-0.050 (0.151)	0.292 (0.121)	0.233 (0.149)	-0.155 (0.180)	0.059 (0.157)	0.037 (0.174)	0.134 (0.137)	-0.021 (0.140)	2.852 (2.625)
Duration (in seconds)	0.014 (0.028)	0.003 (0.055)	0.004 (0.057)	-0.026 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.018)	0.028 (0.020)	0.020 (0.013)	0.022 (0.017)	-1.277 (1.158)
Effort put into answering the survey	-0.021 (0.021)	0.033 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.055 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.037)	-0.010 (0.038)	0.007 (0.039)	-1.217 (0.804)
University degree (D)	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.053 (0.053)	-0.118 (0.056)	0.096 (0.064)	0.000 (0.060)	-0.034 (0.078)	0.112 (0.058)	0.051 (0.056)	0.080 (0.052)	-2.222 (1.474)
Political interest	0.037 (0.026)	0.062 (0.034)	0.032 (0.033)	0.059 (0.040)	0.032 (0.045)	0.034 (0.045)	0.084 (0.040)	0.064 (0.037)	0.074 (0.037)	1.300 (1.003)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.040 (0.023)	0.057 (0.030)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.105 (0.034)	0.038 (0.032)	-0.002 (0.039)	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.029)	-0.019 (0.027)	1.085 (0.786)
Support for favorite party	-0.035 (0.027)	0.018 (0.037)	0.025 (0.034)	0.032 (0.035)	0.014 (0.042)	0.036 (0.040)	0.048 (0.035)	0.010 (0.031)	0.013 (0.031)	-0.071 (0.668)
Political knowledge score	-0.019 (0.025)	0.033 (0.034)	0.045 (0.033)	0.015 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.039)	0.064 (0.043)	-0.038 (0.033)	0.007 (0.032)	0.013 (0.032)	-0.772 (0.929)
Sustainability score	0.053 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.033)	0.023 (0.030)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.034 (0.037)	0.028 (0.031)	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.053 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.030)	0.845 (0.675)
NEP score	0.029 (0.030)	0.030 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.031)	0.039 (0.034)	0.038 (0.030)	0.061 (0.031)	0.054 (0.029)	0.091 (0.030)	0.019 (0.033)	0.461 (0.756)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.030)	0.042 (0.032)	-0.053 (0.031)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.087 (0.037)	-0.033 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.033)	1.002 (0.787)
Trusting people in general	0.014 (0.025)	0.035 (0.034)	0.006 (0.030)	0.004 (0.029)	0.029 (0.032)	0.089 (0.039)	0.030 (0.028)	0.058 (0.031)	0.001 (0.026)	1.088 (0.612)
Trusting parties	0.012 (0.028)	0.003 (0.040)	-0.050 (0.033)	-0.037 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.037)	-0.087 (0.035)	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.060 (0.032)	-0.013 (0.027)	-1.313 (0.772)
Constant	-0.056 (0.120)	0.202 (0.181)	-0.313 (0.150)	-0.312 (0.163)	0.331 (0.200)	0.070 (0.191)	-0.144 (0.144)	-0.171 (0.145)	0.030 (0.141)	-1.380 (3.364)
Party controls	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 848	Yes 845
Observations	848	848	848	848	848	848	848	848	848	845

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urogen. self; (5) Urogen. gov.; (6) Urogen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S1.23: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables (pro statements)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Unexpected cue (D)	-0.022 (0.049)	0.012 (0.066)	-0.077 (0.055)	-0.092 (0.077)	-0.062 (0.060)	-0.017 (0.073)	0.052 (0.050)	0.039 (0.048)	0.065 (0.045)	-2.287 (1.316)
Support for treatment party	0.003 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.033 (0.026)	-0.027 (0.031)	-0.055 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.773 (0.673)
Female (D)	-0.010 (0.051)	0.027 (0.051)	0.042 (0.048)	-0.115 (0.057)	-0.076 (0.060)	-0.116 (0.054)	-0.008 (0.045)	-0.057 (0.045)	-0.114 (0.044)	-0.195 (1.289)
Age	0.062 (0.023)	0.051 (0.031)	0.042 (0.027)	0.052 (0.037)	0.038 (0.031)	0.046 (0.033)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.026)	0.778 (0.686)
Children (D)	0.010 (0.044)	0.028 (0.062)	0.011 (0.050)	-0.078 (0.069)	-0.038 (0.060)	-0.049 (0.061)	0.055 (0.051)	-0.021 (0.044)	0.060 (0.040)	-0.056 (1.209)
Living in a major city (D)	-0.014 (0.036)	-0.099 (0.044)	-0.003 (0.043)	0.060 (0.053)	0.001 (0.048)	-0.025 (0.048)	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.032 (0.041)	-0.072 (0.030)	-0.349 (1.307)
Germany is country of birth (D)	0.031 (0.106)	0.103 (0.089)	0.064 (0.097)	0.038 (0.137)	-0.044 (0.167)	-0.034 (0.123)	0.074 (0.116)	0.029 (0.114)	-0.022 (0.135)	4.265 (2.435)
Duration (in seconds)	0.038 (0.029)	0.012 (0.016)	0.012 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.017)	0.006 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.017)	0.017 (0.013)	0.024 (0.014)	0.016 (0.015)	0.736 (0.944)
Effort put into answering the survey	-0.047 (0.020)	0.021 (0.029)	0.020 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.029)	0.027 (0.026)	0.040 (0.024)	0.021 (0.018)	0.007 (0.017)	0.031 (0.017)	0.232 (0.515)
University degree (D)	-0.002 (0.043)	0.002 (0.048)	0.070 (0.044)	0.134 (0.057)	0.070 (0.053)	0.018 (0.053)	0.021 (0.045)	-0.030 (0.043)	-0.016 (0.044)	1.013 (1.236)
Political interest	0.041 (0.026)	0.049 (0.038)	-0.008 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.041)	-0.043 (0.038)	0.019 (0.039)	0.008 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.026)	-1.111 (0.722)
Own political orientation (left-right)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.010 (0.024)	0.022 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	-0.009 (0.027)	0.009 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.017)	0.085 (0.657)
Support for favorite party	0.027 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.028)	0.075 (0.031)	0.089 (0.031)	0.000 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.040 (0.023)	0.040 (0.029)	-0.039 (0.577)
Political knowledge score	-0.051 (0.025)	0.010 (0.030)	0.026 (0.026)	-0.081 (0.044)	-0.056 (0.031)	-0.055 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.041 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.522 (0.736)
Sustainability score	0.028 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.031)	-0.048 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.032)	0.004 (0.029)	0.020 (0.027)	0.021 (0.023)	0.042 (0.020)	0.008 (0.023)	-0.094 (0.808)
NEP score	0.036 (0.023)	0.047 (0.042)	0.038 (0.031)	0.030 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.031)	-0.026 (0.034)	0.032 (0.028)	0.013 (0.025)	0.042 (0.028)	-0.933 (0.650)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.063 (0.045)	0.010 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.031)	0.012 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.033)	0.005 (0.028)	0.006 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.029)	1.180 (0.749)
Trusting people in general	-0.011 (0.022)	0.005 (0.029)	0.028 (0.024)	-0.028 (0.028)	0.037 (0.029)	0.027 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.025)	0.016 (0.021)	0.033 (0.025)	-0.420 (0.569)
Trusting parties	-0.002 (0.023)	0.019 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.035)	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.026)	0.012 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.025)	-0.043 (0.023)	-0.535 (0.696)
Constant	0.143 (0.137)	0.011 (0.130)	-0.167 (0.134)	0.161 (0.165)	0.112 (0.193)	0.136 (0.156)	-0.233 (0.125)	-0.100 (0.129)	0.024 (0.142)	-0.403 (3.609)
Party controls	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 923	Yes 919
Observations	923	923	923	923	923	923	923	923	923	919

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.


S2 Study 2

S2.1 Control variables

Control variables include personal data, i.e. gender, age, number of children, educational level, place of residence and birth country, as well as information on political interest and orientation, political and climate change knowledge, own sustainable behavior and beliefs about environmental change, overall trust and trust in parties, support of ones favorite party, dummies for the parties the respondents voted for and the duration of answering the questionnaire as well as self reported effort in answering it. Income was not used as a control variable as 28 people, i.e. seven percent of the sample, did not answer this question, thus the sample size would have decreased remarkably, while the effect of this variable is negligible (see Table S2.4). For more details on all variables see section A.4 in the Online Appendix.

S2.2 Tables and figures

Figure S2.1: Distribution of answers before treatment



Notes. Organizations against more climate protection: EIKE = "Europäisches Institut für Klima und Energie", CFACT = "Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow"; Organizations in favor of more climate protection: BUND = "Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland", FFF = "Fridays for Future".

Table S2.1: Summary statistics by treatment group

	consensus con		disagreement		consensus pro	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Female (D)	0.58	(0.50)	0.49	(0.50)	0.53	(0.50)
Age	46.61	(15.17)	45.41	(15.49)	44.19	(16.13)
Monthly net income	1960.14	(1223.98)	2082.43	(1412.54)	1844.48	(1224.95)
University degree (D)	0.27	(0.45)	0.28	(0.45)	0.23	(0.43)
Political interest	3.16	(0.96)	3.48	(1.05)	3.36	(1.00)
Own political orientation (left-right)	5.15	(1.65)	5.27	(1.96)	5.07	(1.71)
Political knowledge score	5.04	(2.41)	5.71	(2.41)	5.10	(2.53)
Sustainability score	3.18	(0.69)	3.21	(0.72)	3.17	(0.65)
NEP score	3.97	(0.53)	3.87	(0.50)	3.89	(0.51)
Climate change knowledge score	4.59	(1.92)	4.41	(1.80)	4.34	(1.76)
Observations	113		156		119	

Table S2.2: Wilcoxon tests for main dependent variable and all respondents

	(1)	(2)
	Desire for action	Donations
Rank Sum (con/disagree)	0.572 (0.565)	0.976 (-0.030)
Rank Sum (pro/disagree)	0.030 (-2.164)	0.856 (0.181)
Signed-Rank (con)	0.560 (0.583)	0.806 (0.246)
Signed-Rank (pro)	0.000 (4.400)	0.909 (-0.114)
Signed-Rank (disagree)	0.172 (1.364)	0.864 (0.172)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses.

Table S2.3: OLS estimation results for treatment groups

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World	Donations
Con consensus treatment	-0.094 (0.068)	-0.258 (0.116)	-0.066 (0.068)	-0.093 (0.060)	-0.144 (0.074)	-0.185 (0.087)	2.927 (2.429)
Pro consensus treatment	0.083 (0.060)	0.290 (0.082)	0.060 (0.055)	0.190 (0.052)	0.164 (0.054)	0.064 (0.064)	2.624 (3.107)
Constant	1.451 (0.421)	1.525 (0.570)	1.829 (0.377)	0.617 (0.232)	1.240 (0.380)	2.145 (0.480)	27.609 (9.736)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	386
R^2	0.797	0.641	0.757	0.823	0.839	0.721	0.875

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables as well as pre-treatment desire for action. All included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S2.4: OLS estimation results for treatment groups with income variable

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World	Donations
Con consensus treatment	-0.104 (0.073)	-0.318 (0.115)	-0.080 (0.071)	-0.124 (0.064)	-0.162 (0.081)	-0.222 (0.086)	3.371 (2.456)
Pro consensus treatment	0.085 (0.072)	0.251 (0.081)	0.056 (0.060)	0.176 (0.059)	0.156 (0.064)	0.044 (0.065)	3.323 (3.089)
Monthly net income	-0.047 (0.034)	0.087 (0.053)	0.033 (0.037)	-0.007 (0.028)	0.018 (0.039)	0.054 (0.034)	0.122 (1.415)
Constant	1.313 (0.390)	1.288 (0.590)	1.941 (0.393)	0.569 (0.246)	1.166 (0.357)	2.100 (0.484)	24.689 (10.025)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	360	360	360	360	360	360	358
R^2	0.809	0.664	0.754	0.829	0.841	0.734	0.879

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables as well as pre-treatment desire for action. All included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. The income variable is standardized. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S2.5: OLS estimation p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World	Donations
Con consensus treatment	0.192 (0.068)	-0.221 (0.118)	0.347 (0.075)	0.155 (0.061)	0.069 (0.078)	0.053 (0.088)	0.260 (2.550)
Pro consensus treatment	0.190	0.005	0.276	0.002	0.003	0.345	0.462
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables as well as pre-treatment desire for action. All included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations. Adjusted p-values are calculated using a bootstrap with 10,000 replications and employing the Stata module mhtreg developed by Andreas Steinmayr (link: <https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458853.html>).

Table S2.6: OLS estimation results for treatment groups (delta)

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Desire for action (delta)	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World	Donations
Con consensus treatment	-0.054 (0.068)	-0.221 (0.118)	-0.057 (0.075)	-0.096 (0.061)	-0.116 (0.078)	-0.119 (0.088)	2.686 (2.550)
Pro consensus treatment	0.066 (0.063)	0.297 (0.085)	0.046 (0.063)	0.178 (0.053)	0.140 (0.057)	0.091 (0.070)	3.880 (3.349)
Constant	0.419 (0.394)	-0.262 (0.494)	0.304 (0.275)	-0.087 (0.177)	0.220 (0.398)	0.329 (0.244)	27.627 (9.922)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	386
R^2	0.195	0.246	0.204	0.247	0.245	0.193	0.263

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. All included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S2.7: OLS estimation results for treatment groups and all respondents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World	Donations
Con consensus treatment	-0.059 (0.058)	-0.133 (0.099)	-0.059 (0.065)	-0.047 (0.055)	-0.099 (0.062)	-0.112 (0.074)	1.722 (2.207)
Pro consensus treatment	0.097 (0.059)	0.274 (0.083)	0.055 (0.056)	0.161 (0.053)	0.175 (0.056)	0.079 (0.065)	1.452 (2.869)
Constant	1.545 (0.415)	1.601 (0.532)	1.778 (0.343)	0.640 (0.217)	1.209 (0.371)	2.315 (0.447)	27.926 (9.571)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	468	468	468	468	468	468	466
R^2	0.790	0.631	0.749	0.803	0.836	0.717	0.884

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables as well as pre-treatment desire for action. All included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S2.8: Wilcoxon test results for treatment groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Adequacy	Urgency	Long Term	Self	Gov	World
Rank Sum (con/disagree)	0.719 (0.360)	0.039 (2.067)	0.944 (0.070)	0.405 (0.833)	0.283 (1.074)	0.245 (1.164)
Rank Sum (pro/disagree)	0.658 (-0.442)	0.016 (-2.409)	0.184 (-1.329)	0.002 (-3.167)	0.276 (-1.088)	0.342 (-0.951)
Signed-Rank (con=0)	0.246 (1.160)	0.128 (-1.521)	0.357 (-0.921)	0.305 (-1.025)	0.731 (-0.343)	0.553 (-0.593)
Signed-Rank (pro=0)	0.026 (2.222)	0.000 (4.416)	0.181 (1.338)	0.000 (4.347)	0.008 (2.657)	0.021 (2.299)
Signed-Rank (disagree=0)	0.062 (1.865)	0.152 (1.434)	0.553 (-0.594)	0.939 (0.076)	0.190 (1.311)	0.381 (0.877)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses.

Table S2.9: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Desire for action (post-treatment)			
University degree (D)	-0.220 (0.216)	-0.073 (0.081)	-0.075 (0.063)
Political interest	-0.144 (0.101)	0.012 (0.051)	-0.087 (0.032)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.059 (0.057)	-0.052 (0.044)	0.016 (0.028)
Support for favorite party	-0.029 (0.069)	0.044 (0.050)	0.065 (0.043)
Political knowledge score	0.205 (0.156)	0.024 (0.063)	0.047 (0.039)
Sustainability score	0.002 (0.077)	0.078 (0.045)	0.048 (0.040)
NEP score	0.073 (0.070)	-0.021 (0.054)	0.073 (0.031)
Climate change knowledge score	0.030 (0.056)	0.051 (0.059)	-0.006 (0.039)
Trusting people in general	0.087 (0.043)	0.005 (0.056)	-0.039 (0.030)
Trusting parties	-0.010 (0.072)	0.037 (0.044)	-0.007 (0.033)
Respondent would vote (D)	0.030 (0.225)	0.015 (0.143)	-0.098 (0.085)
Constant	1.191 (0.500)	1.033 (0.480)	1.318 (0.320)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	156	119
R^2	0.795	0.761	0.896

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional to pre-treatment desire for action, remaining included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S2.10: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables (delta)

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Desire for action (delta)	consensus con	disagreement	consensus pro
University degree (D)	-0.230 (0.220)	-0.096 (0.079)	-0.052 (0.076)
Political interest	-0.116 (0.100)	0.023 (0.054)	-0.094 (0.031)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.090 (0.055)	-0.030 (0.039)	0.017 (0.030)
Support for favorite party	0.001 (0.065)	0.057 (0.052)	0.047 (0.045)
Political knowledge score	0.196 (0.157)	0.014 (0.069)	0.053 (0.040)
Sustainability score	0.003 (0.081)	0.075 (0.046)	0.028 (0.041)
NEP score	-0.004 (0.072)	-0.104 (0.066)	-0.009 (0.041)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.021 (0.049)	0.037 (0.058)	-0.047 (0.038)
Trusting people in general	0.081 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.059)	-0.047 (0.034)
Trusting parties	-0.026 (0.074)	0.027 (0.045)	-0.007 (0.037)
Respondent would vote (D)	-0.070 (0.197)	0.048 (0.156)	-0.077 (0.090)
Constant	0.503 (0.290)	0.136 (0.201)	0.227 (0.163)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	156	119
R^2	0.145	0.143	0.147

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Remaining included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S2.11: OLS estimation p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	consensus con	disagreement	consensus pro
University degree (D)	0.499	0.387	0.251
Political interest	0.318	0.814	0.013
Own pol. orientation (left - right)	0.343	0.276	0.563
Support for favorite party	0.711	0.392	0.180
Political knowledge score	0.417	0.718	0.255
Sustainability score	0.978	0.104	0.239
NEP score	0.311	0.699	0.026
Climate change knowledge score	0.596	0.403	0.882
Trusting people in general	0.045	0.937	0.212
Trusting parties	0.904	0.415	0.835
Respondent would vote (D)	0.901	0.919	0.258
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional to pre-treatment desire for action, remaining included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized. Adjusted p-values are calculated using a bootstrap with 10,000 replications and employing the Stata module mhtreg developed by Andreas Steinmayr (link: <https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458853.html>).

Table S2.12: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables and all respondents

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Desire for action (post-treatment)	consensus con	disagreement	consensus pro
University degree (D)	-0.193 (0.181)	-0.073 (0.081)	-0.024 (0.081)
Political interest	-0.083 (0.070)	0.012 (0.051)	-0.091 (0.030)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.058 (0.042)	-0.053 (0.045)	0.065 (0.037)
Support for favorite party	-0.060 (0.055)	0.047 (0.054)	0.043 (0.030)
Political knowledge score	0.142 (0.119)	0.024 (0.063)	0.011 (0.033)
Sustainability score	0.023 (0.054)	0.078 (0.045)	0.054 (0.042)
NEP score	0.015 (0.051)	-0.022 (0.056)	0.065 (0.035)
Climate change knowledge score	0.029 (0.039)	0.050 (0.059)	0.049 (0.042)
Trusting people in general	0.054 (0.033)	0.005 (0.056)	-0.032 (0.026)
Trusting parties	0.033 (0.058)	0.037 (0.045)	-0.025 (0.031)
Respondent would vote (D)	0.040 (0.161)	0.015 (0.143)	-0.055 (0.093)
Constant	1.090 (0.403)	1.032 (0.479)	1.354 (0.366)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	155	156	157
R^2	0.806	0.761	0.837

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional to pre-treatment desire for action, remaining included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S2.13: Probit estimation marginal effects for additional explanatory variables

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Desire for action (change dummy)	consensus con	disagreement	consensus pro
University degree (D)	0.063 (0.081)	-0.039 (0.055)	-0.090 (0.073)
Political interest	0.113 (0.046)	0.012 (0.026)	-0.058 (0.046)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.011 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.024)	0.061 (0.033)
Support for favorite party	0.038 (0.035)	-0.067 (0.029)	0.042 (0.033)
Political knowledge score	-0.114 (0.054)	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.036)
Sustainability score	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.028 (0.030)	0.052 (0.035)
NEP score	-0.144 (0.042)	-0.042 (0.028)	-0.013 (0.042)
Climate change knowledge score	0.036 (0.038)	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.027 (0.043)
Trusting people in general	0.019 (0.038)	0.044 (0.036)	-0.025 (0.036)
Trusting parties	-0.021 (0.039)	0.076 (0.031)	0.041 (0.039)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	153	119

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Except for the respondent's voting decision, all controls listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The "change dummy" is 1 if the respondent changed their answer to one of the desire for action questions from before to after the treatment and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S2.14: OLS estimation p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Desire for action (change dummy)	consensus con	disagreement	consensus pro
University degree (D)	0.226	0.351	0.268
Political interest	0.183	0.755	0.188
Own pol. orientation (left - right)	0.748	0.714	0.081
Support for favorite party	0.630	0.067	0.259
Political knowledge score	0.140	0.995	0.798
Sustainability score	0.394	0.411	0.167
NEP score	0.014	0.149	0.573
Climate change knowledge score	0.464	0.253	0.681
Trusting people in general	0.774	0.166	0.674
Trusting parties	0.554	0.071	0.333
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Except for the respondent's voting decision, all controls listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix are included. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized. Adjusted p-values are calculated using a bootstrap with 10,000 replications and employing the Stata module `mhtreg` developed by Andreas Steinmayr (link: <https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458853.html>).

Table S2.15: Probit estimation marginal effects for additional explanatory variables and all respondents

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Desire for action (change dummy)	consensus con	disagreement	consensus pro
University degree (D)	0.068 (0.081)	-0.039 (0.055)	-0.058 (0.062)
Political interest	0.058 (0.039)	0.012 (0.026)	-0.057 (0.039)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.048 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.024)	0.038 (0.026)
Support for favorite party	0.060 (0.030)	-0.072 (0.032)	0.009 (0.027)
Political knowledge score	-0.084 (0.043)	-0.007 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.030)
Sustainability score	-0.067 (0.034)	-0.028 (0.030)	0.060 (0.030)
NEP score	-0.092 (0.039)	-0.044 (0.029)	-0.034 (0.035)
Climate change knowledge score	0.032 (0.036)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.038)
Trusting people in general	0.034 (0.036)	0.044 (0.036)	-0.018 (0.029)
Trusting parties	-0.043 (0.043)	0.078 (0.032)	0.055 (0.032)
Remaining controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	155	153	157

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Except for the respondent's voting decision, all controls listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix are included. The "change dummy" is 1 if the respondent changed their answer to one of the desire for action questions from before to after the treatment and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

S2.3 Separate results for all outcome variables

Table S2.16: Wilcoxon tests for treatment groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rank Sum (con/disagree)	0.719 (0.360)	0.719 (0.360)	0.719 (0.360)	0.039 (2.067)	0.039 (2.067)	0.039 (2.067)	0.944 (0.070)	0.944 (0.070)	0.944 (0.070)	0.785 (-0.273)
Rank Sum (pro/disagree)	0.018 (-2.365)	0.902 (0.123)	0.372 (0.893)	0.095 (-1.670)	0.065 (-1.844)	0.015 (-2.444)	0.111 (-1.596)	0.664 (-0.435)	0.838 (0.204)	0.956 (0.055)
Signed-Rank (pro=0)	0.000 (3.695)	0.227 (1.209)	0.865 (-0.170)	0.002 (3.144)	0.006 (2.762)	0.000 (4.004)	0.536 (0.618)	0.412 (0.820)	0.795 (0.260)	0.980 (0.025)
Signed-Rank (con=0)	0.870 (0.163)	0.269 (1.106)	0.410 (0.825)	0.805 (-0.246)	0.013 (-2.491)	0.013 (-2.476)	0.170 (-1.373)	0.415 (0.816)	0.836 (0.207)	0.543 (0.609)
Signed-Rank (disagree=0)	0.241 (1.173)	0.112 (1.591)	0.276 (1.089)	0.197 (1.291)	0.684 (0.407)	0.393 (0.855)	0.125 (-1.534)	0.823 (0.223)	0.604 (0.519)	0.864 (0.172)

Notes. Z statistics in parentheses. Test for: (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation.

Table S2.17: OLS estimation results for treatment groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pro consensus	0.207 (0.072)	0.061 (0.104)	-0.071 (0.085)	0.190 (0.089)	0.323 (0.110)	0.378 (0.137)	0.136 (0.096)	0.036 (0.074)	-0.035 (0.069)	3.880 (3.349)
Con consensus	-0.088 (0.070)	-0.075 (0.092)	-0.001 (0.118)	-0.156 (0.126)	-0.231 (0.139)	-0.274 (0.163)	-0.045 (0.098)	-0.042 (0.097)	-0.083 (0.079)	2.686 (2.550)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	386
R^2	0.255	0.226	0.164	0.239	0.246	0.226	0.217	0.200	0.203	0.263

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urgen. self; (5) Urgen. gov.; (6) Urgen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. Specifications include control variables and interaction terms with these variables. All included controls are listed in section S2.1 of the Online Appendix. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations.

Table S2.18: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables (con consensus)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Female (D)	-0.035 (0.134)	0.237 (0.161)	0.050 (0.182)	-0.173 (0.219)	-0.372 (0.308)	-0.098 (0.266)	-0.098 (0.183)	-0.038 (0.197)	-0.107 (0.128)	-1.682 (3.490)
Age	0.124 (0.069)	0.018 (0.095)	-0.086 (0.115)	-0.250 (0.155)	0.037 (0.178)	-0.002 (0.159)	-0.140 (0.122)	-0.111 (0.137)	-0.151 (0.120)	-1.570 (1.951)
Children (D)	-0.114 (0.118)	-0.021 (0.186)	0.170 (0.251)	0.086 (0.201)	-0.042 (0.238)	-0.085 (0.208)	-0.225 (0.141)	-0.080 (0.148)	-0.124 (0.108)	-3.940 (3.666)
Living in a major city (D)	0.002 (0.122)	0.032 (0.134)	0.228 (0.153)	-0.112 (0.218)	0.285 (0.238)	0.400 (0.226)	-0.069 (0.162)	-0.058 (0.163)	0.122 (0.139)	-6.463 (4.473)
Germany is country of birth (D)	-0.527 (0.326)	-0.412 (0.302)	0.487 (0.278)	-0.359 (0.421)	-0.785 (0.457)	-0.807 (0.477)	-0.719 (0.324)	-0.492 (0.386)	-0.559 (0.294)	-2.093 (4.480)
Duration (in seconds)	0.044 (0.056)	-0.010 (0.046)	0.053 (0.058)	-0.234 (0.193)	-0.043 (0.103)	-0.093 (0.111)	-0.132 (0.099)	-0.115 (0.098)	-0.079 (0.075)	-0.266 (0.894)
Effort put into answering the survey	0.038 (0.053)	-0.114 (0.066)	-0.067 (0.070)	-0.024 (0.095)	-0.171 (0.139)	-0.155 (0.099)	-0.100 (0.079)	-0.013 (0.104)	-0.092 (0.059)	-0.243 (1.786)
University degree (D)	-0.020 (0.170)	0.197 (0.155)	0.233 (0.153)	-0.237 (0.404)	-0.163 (0.408)	-0.455 (0.401)	-0.578 (0.335)	-0.552 (0.370)	-0.492 (0.321)	-9.630 (7.089)
Political interest	0.056 (0.083)	-0.024 (0.081)	0.070 (0.097)	-0.247 (0.221)	-0.210 (0.187)	-0.180 (0.204)	-0.177 (0.156)	-0.131 (0.181)	-0.197 (0.145)	2.028 (3.660)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.092 (0.054)	0.146 (0.075)	0.083 (0.087)	0.112 (0.126)	0.209 (0.147)	0.133 (0.120)	0.047 (0.080)	-0.058 (0.075)	0.041 (0.053)	-0.326 (1.748)
Support for favorite party	-0.006 (0.044)	-0.065 (0.084)	-0.094 (0.106)	0.120 (0.119)	0.124 (0.174)	0.107 (0.146)	-0.036 (0.067)	-0.035 (0.081)	-0.104 (0.065)	-4.272 (2.755)
Political knowledge score	-0.114 (0.114)	0.141 (0.111)	-0.023 (0.146)	0.361 (0.287)	0.380 (0.275)	0.154 (0.276)	0.287 (0.232)	0.235 (0.264)	0.343 (0.222)	3.014 (2.479)
Sustainability score	0.037 (0.069)	-0.105 (0.074)	-0.026 (0.090)	-0.037 (0.146)	0.125 (0.164)	0.045 (0.151)	-0.002 (0.126)	0.076 (0.140)	-0.081 (0.096)	4.069 (3.475)
NEP score	0.020 (0.086)	0.005 (0.109)	-0.111 (0.128)	0.089 (0.172)	-0.030 (0.140)	0.023 (0.133)	0.010 (0.105)	-0.036 (0.132)	-0.003 (0.049)	-1.626 (1.850)
Climate change knowledge score	0.012 (0.056)	0.045 (0.075)	-0.007 (0.084)	-0.123 (0.111)	-0.046 (0.115)	-0.093 (0.108)	0.005 (0.072)	-0.040 (0.083)	0.059 (0.051)	0.779 (2.556)
Trusting people in general	0.001 (0.051)	-0.014 (0.089)	0.036 (0.103)	0.057 (0.118)	0.173 (0.123)	0.249 (0.146)	0.038 (0.078)	0.109 (0.073)	0.079 (0.058)	-3.170 (2.330)
Trusting parties	0.031 (0.068)	0.053 (0.083)	0.153 (0.113)	-0.015 (0.144)	-0.048 (0.158)	-0.027 (0.148)	-0.095 (0.110)	-0.206 (0.113)	-0.084 (0.097)	1.129 (2.419)
Respondent would vote (D)	0.259 (0.262)	0.353 (0.244)	0.043 (0.275)	-0.378 (0.338)	-0.649 (0.443)	-0.387 (0.593)	-0.144 (0.172)	-0.065 (0.200)	0.341 (0.170)	-0.397 (12.533)
Constant	0.341 (0.421)	-0.049 (0.432)	-0.734 (0.457)	0.765 (0.514)	0.963 (0.598)	1.011 (0.732)	1.064 (0.382)	0.764 (0.441)	0.404 (0.359)	11.669 (13.789)
Observations	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113
R ²	0.111	0.130	0.108	0.108	0.149	0.139	0.190	0.151	0.258	0.162

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urogen. self; (5) Urogen. gov.; (6) Urogen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S2.19: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables (disagreement)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Female (D)	0.118 (0.093)	-0.058 (0.169)	-0.044 (0.181)	0.066 (0.154)	0.157 (0.202)	0.310 (0.241)	-0.129 (0.181)	0.091 (0.135)	-0.177 (0.149)	3.798 (3.914)
Age	0.014 (0.058)	0.041 (0.082)	0.076 (0.081)	-0.118 (0.075)	-0.046 (0.084)	0.048 (0.094)	-0.044 (0.094)	-0.047 (0.077)	-0.095 (0.069)	-0.607 (1.618)
Children (D)	-0.035 (0.126)	-0.029 (0.168)	-0.054 (0.166)	-0.132 (0.141)	-0.552 (0.220)	-0.428 (0.242)	-0.127 (0.172)	-0.229 (0.143)	0.115 (0.115)	-5.099 (3.310)
Living in a major city (D)	-0.152 (0.095)	-0.060 (0.138)	0.019 (0.132)	0.084 (0.162)	-0.091 (0.236)	-0.181 (0.266)	0.064 (0.172)	-0.131 (0.156)	-0.001 (0.150)	3.726 (3.286)
Germany is country of birth (D)	-0.321 (0.315)	-0.042 (0.648)	-0.560 (0.334)	0.591 (0.469)	0.280 (0.485)	0.349 (0.901)	-0.374 (0.273)	-0.234 (0.234)	-0.054 (0.167)	-11.145 (5.666)
Duration (in seconds)	0.010 (0.129)	0.283 (0.244)	-0.510 (0.324)	0.306 (0.212)	-0.299 (0.323)	-0.427 (0.260)	-0.141 (0.375)	0.154 (0.250)	0.233 (0.226)	0.966 (2.643)
Effort put into answering the survey	0.058 (0.037)	0.002 (0.063)	0.028 (0.071)	-0.023 (0.069)	0.098 (0.084)	0.039 (0.082)	0.079 (0.076)	0.052 (0.046)	0.028 (0.048)	-1.785 (1.759)
University degree (D)	-0.022 (0.100)	0.051 (0.162)	-0.000 (0.140)	-0.268 (0.136)	-0.052 (0.154)	-0.063 (0.183)	-0.147 (0.192)	-0.270 (0.120)	-0.092 (0.120)	-0.266 (3.420)
Political interest	-0.031 (0.056)	-0.021 (0.088)	0.119 (0.095)	0.034 (0.096)	-0.002 (0.127)	-0.070 (0.138)	0.080 (0.086)	0.069 (0.068)	0.033 (0.067)	2.669 (2.017)
Own political orientation (left-right)	0.064 (0.055)	0.029 (0.083)	-0.075 (0.069)	0.021 (0.059)	-0.102 (0.063)	-0.052 (0.068)	-0.097 (0.080)	-0.034 (0.077)	-0.024 (0.077)	-1.946 (1.883)
Support for favorite party	0.046 (0.047)	0.010 (0.082)	0.041 (0.079)	0.077 (0.072)	0.121 (0.132)	0.166 (0.113)	-0.046 (0.080)	0.110 (0.093)	-0.009 (0.064)	0.503 (2.017)
Political knowledge score	0.069 (0.054)	0.050 (0.082)	-0.063 (0.096)	-0.063 (0.117)	0.139 (0.146)	0.159 (0.175)	-0.135 (0.096)	0.020 (0.091)	-0.046 (0.092)	0.615 (1.874)
Sustainability score	0.021 (0.050)	0.126 (0.088)	0.107 (0.075)	0.177 (0.068)	0.177 (0.113)	0.205 (0.134)	-0.030 (0.073)	-0.061 (0.065)	-0.043 (0.061)	0.734 (2.249)
NEP score	-0.003 (0.049)	-0.095 (0.080)	-0.259 (0.099)	-0.049 (0.097)	-0.129 (0.121)	-0.243 (0.132)	-0.070 (0.124)	-0.064 (0.085)	-0.022 (0.095)	-2.624 (1.170)
Climate change knowledge score	0.004 (0.046)	0.024 (0.078)	0.114 (0.093)	0.088 (0.075)	-0.193 (0.136)	-0.039 (0.145)	0.121 (0.084)	0.100 (0.073)	0.117 (0.080)	2.639 (1.561)
Trusting people in general	-0.008 (0.065)	-0.068 (0.101)	-0.060 (0.112)	0.114 (0.068)	-0.128 (0.128)	-0.096 (0.135)	0.004 (0.079)	0.073 (0.111)	0.005 (0.098)	0.438 (1.610)
Trusting parties	0.082 (0.054)	0.121 (0.087)	0.010 (0.087)	-0.064 (0.079)	0.071 (0.084)	0.046 (0.108)	-0.003 (0.087)	-0.072 (0.089)	0.055 (0.079)	-1.699 (1.848)
Respondent would vote (D)	0.130 (0.159)	0.307 (0.262)	-0.334 (0.260)	0.392 (0.264)	0.047 (0.339)	-0.156 (0.306)	0.149 (0.173)	-0.233 (0.288)	0.131 (0.134)	-18.205 (8.805)
Constant	0.253 (0.364)	-0.090 (0.699)	0.917 (0.417)	-0.721 (0.538)	-0.115 (0.557)	-0.078 (0.917)	0.323 (0.338)	0.685 (0.444)	0.047 (0.210)	25.516 (9.210)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156
R ²	0.115	0.098	0.159	0.179	0.166	0.131	0.077	0.116	0.066	0.145

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. world; (3) Adequ. gov.; (4) Urogen. self; (5) Urogen. gov.; (6) Urogen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

Table S2.20: OLS estimation results for additional explanatory variables (pro consensus)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Female (D)	-0.184 (0.122)	-0.246 (0.195)	-0.021 (0.149)	-0.118 (0.170)	-0.060 (0.148)	-0.052 (0.153)	-0.098 (0.123)	0.049 (0.138)	-0.011 (0.173)	-1.184 (5.958)
Age	0.003 (0.061)	0.012 (0.084)	0.010 (0.087)	0.034 (0.096)	0.044 (0.101)	0.090 (0.121)	-0.009 (0.091)	0.052 (0.071)	0.009 (0.073)	4.108 (3.376)
Children (D)	0.035 (0.147)	-0.352 (0.215)	-0.075 (0.175)	0.296 (0.166)	-0.153 (0.220)	-0.268 (0.258)	0.223 (0.140)	0.090 (0.129)	0.035 (0.097)	4.496 (4.975)
Living in a major city (D)	0.071 (0.154)	0.106 (0.145)	-0.077 (0.097)	0.039 (0.174)	0.371 (0.238)	0.556 (0.252)	0.129 (0.129)	0.008 (0.112)	-0.040 (0.081)	2.451 (5.521)
Germany is country of birth (D)	-0.250 (0.300)	-0.126 (0.227)	-0.315 (0.323)	0.904 (0.402)	0.109 (0.315)	-0.194 (0.519)	0.128 (0.304)	-0.029 (0.169)	-0.102 (0.152)	-1.910 (13.102)
Duration (in seconds)	0.003 (0.013)	0.047 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.032 (0.016)	0.020 (0.017)	0.006 (0.018)	0.015 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.016)	0.070 (0.770)
Effort put into answering the survey	0.012 (0.061)	0.103 (0.083)	-0.040 (0.054)	-0.034 (0.076)	0.084 (0.057)	0.016 (0.064)	-0.051 (0.049)	0.067 (0.053)	0.090 (0.046)	-3.640 (3.866)
University degree (D)	-0.204 (0.120)	-0.149 (0.147)	0.034 (0.117)	0.115 (0.152)	-0.181 (0.165)	0.116 (0.205)	0.046 (0.190)	-0.056 (0.136)	-0.187 (0.126)	-12.024 (6.194)
Political interest	-0.093 (0.096)	-0.197 (0.158)	-0.006 (0.088)	-0.249 (0.089)	-0.169 (0.096)	-0.183 (0.098)	-0.020 (0.066)	-0.004 (0.058)	0.074 (0.049)	2.186 (4.269)
Own political orientation (left-right)	-0.019 (0.074)	0.137 (0.081)	-0.011 (0.080)	-0.037 (0.071)	0.083 (0.071)	-0.007 (0.078)	-0.050 (0.054)	0.056 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.042)	-3.345 (3.085)
Support for favorite party	0.010 (0.092)	0.010 (0.134)	-0.058 (0.076)	0.103 (0.090)	0.272 (0.114)	-0.043 (0.136)	0.196 (0.128)	-0.061 (0.094)	-0.003 (0.064)	-10.930 (4.066)
Political knowledge score	0.036 (0.086)	0.230 (0.128)	0.064 (0.069)	0.125 (0.090)	0.053 (0.094)	0.053 (0.125)	0.012 (0.094)	-0.034 (0.080)	-0.066 (0.059)	1.503 (4.039)
Sustainability score	0.153 (0.092)	0.216 (0.158)	-0.007 (0.088)	-0.095 (0.078)	0.028 (0.109)	0.057 (0.128)	-0.149 (0.115)	0.079 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.075)	-0.118 (2.602)
NEP score	0.125 (0.066)	0.127 (0.080)	0.076 (0.061)	-0.240 (0.123)	-0.029 (0.085)	0.084 (0.091)	-0.043 (0.121)	-0.139 (0.083)	-0.045 (0.060)	-0.091 (3.566)
Climate change knowledge score	-0.064 (0.074)	-0.146 (0.095)	0.038 (0.080)	0.150 (0.078)	-0.134 (0.083)	-0.163 (0.124)	-0.096 (0.081)	-0.031 (0.066)	0.021 (0.059)	-3.489 (3.923)
Trusting people in general	-0.000 (0.066)	-0.104 (0.086)	0.008 (0.061)	0.035 (0.087)	-0.035 (0.083)	-0.109 (0.094)	0.035 (0.081)	-0.060 (0.068)	-0.190 (0.095)	-0.099 (3.077)
Trusting parties	-0.076 (0.082)	-0.071 (0.101)	0.124 (0.095)	-0.119 (0.098)	0.036 (0.092)	0.192 (0.094)	-0.148 (0.066)	-0.079 (0.082)	0.077 (0.075)	0.648 (2.911)
Respondent would vote (D)	-0.214 (0.214)	-0.093 (0.293)	-0.149 (0.200)	-0.124 (0.245)	-0.381 (0.252)	0.326 (0.271)	-0.472 (0.409)	0.204 (0.247)	0.207 (0.166)	1.511 (8.596)
Constant	0.763 (0.394)	0.666 (0.454)	0.478 (0.414)	-0.602 (0.487)	0.488 (0.381)	0.156 (0.553)	0.261 (0.426)	-0.143 (0.312)	-0.022 (0.245)	2.821 (14.883)
Observations	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	117
R ²	0.149	0.232	0.087	0.231	0.173	0.155	0.149	0.133	0.139	0.212

Notes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dep. vars.: Delta of (1) Adequ. self; (2) Adequ. gov.; (3) Adequ. world; (4) Urogen. self; (5) Urogen. gov.; (6) Urogen. world; (7) Long t. self; (8) Long t. gov.; (9) Long t. world; (10) Donation. The sample size for column (7) is smaller due to the exclusion of deltas for donation decisions that deviated by more than five standard deviations. All explanatory variables except for dummies are standardized.

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